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I. INTRODUCTION
Almost since the founding of the Republic, the United States
Supreme Court has faced controversies which have involved inter-
pretation of Constitutional provisions relating to separation of
powers of the executive.' Many of the earliest Supreme Court cases
• Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law and Associate Dean
Designate, Widener University School of Law; B.A., University of Pittsburg; J.D.,
Duquesne Law School; LL. M., Yale Law School. This article was written with a
research grant from the Noble J. Dick Endowment Fund of Duquesne University,
which the author gratefully acknowledges.
1. E.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 162 (1803). In the Mar-
bury opinion, Chief Justice Marshall stated "[a]s the law creating the office, gave
the officer a right to hold for five years, independent of the executive, the ap-
pointment was not revocable; but vested in the officer legal rights, which are pro-
tected by the laws of his country."
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in this area were contradictory.2 Indeed, there is considerable evi-
dence that the framers of the Constitution themselves could not
agree on the meaning or significance of constitutional language de-
fining the appointment and removal powers of the executive
branch.3 For example, in the early part of this century, the well-
known cases of Myers v. United States4 and Humphrey's Executor
v. United States,5 addressed the issue of the executive power to
remove governmental officers, with seemingly contradictory results.
More recently, the debate has been renewed in several major Su-
preme Court cases involving removal power.6 It could easily be ar-
gued that these cases establish that Article II, section 2, Clause 2
of the United States Constitution' is so vague that the Supreme
2. Compare Ex Parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230 (1839), (power of Con-
gress to provide for appointment of inferior officers under Article II limited to
permit appointment only be department of government to which the officer to be
appointed most appropriately belonged) with Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371
(1879) (Congress can authorize appointment of executive officer by a court of
law).
3. In 1789, in the House of Representatives, James Madison introduced a bill
to establish, among others, an executive department for foreign affairs, which was
to be staffed by an officer who was to be removable from office by the President.
Some representatives understood the language giving the President the power to
remove this officer to pose the issue of whether the Constitution mandated that
the executive must seek the acquiesence of the Senate in removing such an officer,
or whether the President had inherent removal power. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS
473-600 (1789). A vigorous protracted debate followed. Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52 (1926). The action of Congress in enacting this statute has come to be
known as the Decision of 1789, and will be hereinafter referred to as the Decision
of 1789.
4. 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (Constitution in Article II places "no express limit..
on the power of removal by the executive").
5. 295 U.S. 602, 625 (1935) (distinguished Myers case, but stated that, "[W]e
think it plain under the Constitution that illimitable power of removal is not pos-
sessed by the President .... )
6. Compare Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (Supreme Court held that
Congress could not constitutionally appoint the members of the Federal Election
Commission, for to do so was to invade the power of the executive) and Bowsher
v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (Congressional retention of power to remove Comp-
troller General, who performs executive function, is invasion of executive branch
power) with Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988) (no violation of executive
power for special prosecutor to be appointed by branch other than executive
branch and for prosecutor not to be removable by the Executive).
7. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, which provides that the President:
shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the senate,
shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of
the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States whose ap-
176 [Vol. 11:175
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Court is unable to interpret or to apply it consistently.
Why have there been such wide divergences in the cases in-
volving executive power to remove? This Article attempts a partial
answer to that puzzle. One thesis of this Article is that the relevant
constitutional language of Article II, section 2, Clause 2 is unclear
or ambiguous. A second thesis is that the Appointments Clause can
only be interpreted in light of the concept of separation of powers
and further, that the concept of separation of powers is itself not
without ambiguity once one moves away from the core concept of
separation and its purposes. In such a situation, it is normal for
the Supreme Court, or any court for that matter, to use certain
aids in interpreting the statutory language involved. One major de-
vice which the Supreme Court has used to resolve Appointments
Clause removal contfoversies has been to resort to legislative in-
tent." Supreme Court efforts in this area have involved attempts to
discern the meaning and objectives of the Founding Fathers, as re-
vealed in The Federalist9 and other tracts,10 that urged adoption
of the then-proposed Constitution, as well as examination of the
debates at the Constitutional Convention, and not long thereafter,
in the First Congress."
A third thesis of this Article is that most of the differences in
the Supreme Court cases involving the Appointments Clause have
been caused by different perceptions of the justices deciding those
cases about the history and meaning of the Appointments Clause;
the doctrine of separation of powers; and the intent of the found-
ing fathers. A principal idea that will be developed in this Article
is that judicial perceptions of the history of the Appointments
Clause, the removal power, and separation of powers are outcome-
determinative. This thesis can and will be examined and developed
by examining the cases, the apparent perceptions of the opinion
writers about the legislative intent of the founding fathers, and the
history of the Appointments Clause and removal powers.
pointments are not herein othe-wise provided for, and which shall be
established by law: but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of
such inferior officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the
courts of law, or in the heads of departments.
(This clause of the United States Constitution will hereafter be referred to as the
Appointments Clause.)
8. Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
9. Myers, 272 U.S. 52.
10. Id.
11. Humphreys Executor, 295 U.S. 602.
19891 177
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A final endeavor-and it is a matter of fact, not a thesis-will
be to show that the history of the framers' intent in connection
with the Appointments Clause and separation of powers has been
explained in great detail by historians and other academics. Exam-
ination of that research can help to ascertain which of the contra-
dictory versions of the executive's removal and separation of pow-
ers is more likely to be correct.
II. SEPARATION OF POWERS
A. Introduction
The American concept of separation of powers is a constitu-
tional doctrine which divides the federal government into three
branches; the executive, legislative and judicial. 12 Under the purest
form of separation, the executive branch carries out the laws and
performs no other function, and the judiciary hears cases and ap-
peals and performs no other function. In this system of divided
powers, only the functions which are "appropriate" for a particular
branch may be exercised by it and none of the branches may en-
croach on the powers or functions of the others.13 For example, the
legislature may not execute a statute, and the judiciary may not
enact a statute. The effect of the separation of powers doctrine in
the Constitution is generally to block out the powers of each of the
three branches. A further consequence is that powers assigned or
given to one branch theoretically cannot be exercised by another
branch that is not constitutionally empowered to do so.1" This gen-
eral description is intended as merely a brief restatement of the
12. "It is believed to be one of the chief merits of the American system of
written constitutional law, that all the powers entrusted to governments, whether
state or national, are divided into the three grand departments, the executive, the
legislative, and the judicial." Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190 (1880).
13. That the functions appropriate to each of these branches of govern-
ment shall be vested in a separate body of public servants, and that the
perfection of the system requires that the lines which separate and di-
vide these departments shall be broadly and clearly defined. It is also
essential to the successful working of this system that the persons in-
trusted with power in any of these branches shall not be permitted to
encroach upon the powers confided to the others, but that each shall by
the law of its creation be limited to the exercise of the powers appropri-
ate to its own department and no other.
Id. at 190.
14. Id. at 190-191.
[Vol. 11:175
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doctrine to refresh the reader's recollection. In order to more fully
understand separation of powers doctrine, it is necessary to ex-
amine its history. Such an examination not only helps to make
sense of the constitutional language and structure, but is quite
helpful in identifying the meaning and understanding of the fram-
ers of the Constitution.
Some authorities trace the beginning of the separation of pow-
ers doctrine to Aristotle. 5 Aristotle in his Politics,6 divided gov-
ernment into three parts; the deliberators, the magistrates and the
judiciary. 7 These functionaries were equivalent to a general legis-
lative assembly, to the public officials who carried out the law, and
to a judiciary. 18 However, Aristotle's division between the branches
was not drawn along functional lines. In fact, the division between
the three branches was blurred so that there was considerable
overlap of functions.1 9 It should be noted, however, that not all
analysts agree that Aristotle was an early progenitor of the separa-
tion of powers doctrine.20
The true rise of the separation of powers concept occurred af-
ter the middle ages, when the development and rise of Parliament
led to constitutional conflict in the seventeenth century.21 In that
conflict, known as The Glorious Revolution, Parliament prevailed;
separation of powers can only be understood in the context of that
struggle.22 After the Glorious Revolution, the king did not interfere
with acts of Parliament, nor did he interfere with the courts.23
Thus, the sovereign, the legislature, and the courts became sepa-
rate, and began to exercise different functions.2 "
John Locke, the great English philosopher, observed and par-
ticipated in the struggle of Parliament against the king.2" He pub-
15. Sharp, The Classical American Doctrine of "The Separation of Powers,"
2 U. CHI. L.REv. 385 (1935).
16. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS (Rackhams's trans. Loeb Classical Library 1932).
17. Id. at 387.
18. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS (Rackham's trans. Loeb Classical Library 1932) Book
IV, II; Sharp, supra note 15, at 387.
19. Sharp, supra note 15, at 387.
20. Parker, Separation of Powers Revisited, 49 MICH. L. REV. 1009, 1011
(1951) ("Nothing could be farther fetched").
21. Fairlie, The Separation of Powers, 21 MICH. L. REV. 393, 395 (1923).
22. Friedrich, Separation of Powers, 13 ENcyc. Soc. ScI. 663 (1934).
23. Parker, supra note 20, at 1013.
24. Id.
25. Sharp, supra note 15, at 387.
1989]
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lished his Two Treatises of Government" in 1690 to show that
monarchy could co-exist with Parliament, or to put it another way,
that a "monarchy of limited powers" was "desirable. ' 27 In his writ-
ing, Locke divided government into three powers: the legislative
power that would enact statutes for the good of the common-
wealth; the executive power that would attend to the execution of
the laws; and the federative power that would deal with foreign
affairs.2 In this scheme, the monarch would exercise the executive
and federative powers and the parliament would exercise the legis-
lative power.29 Locke thus identified a distinction between the gov-
ernmental organ which exercised a power and the various types of
power which a particular governmental organ or department exer-
cised. Furthermore, Locke's work justified taking some power away
from one branch - a previously all powerful monarch - and giv-
ing it to another governmental organ, the parliament. That divi-
sion was accomplished along functional lines.
The next writer who contributed to the separation of powers
doctrine was the French philosopher, Montesquieu. He studied En-
glish government and drew heavily from the ideas of John Locke. 0
In 1748, Montesquieu published The Spirit of the Laws,"' in which
he described separation of powers in government. Montesquieu,
who was heavily read by the American colonists,32 divided govern-
ment into a legislative department, an executive department for
foreign affairs, and an executive department for civil affairs.3 3 This
last department exercised the judicial power. Montesquieu also
supplied a strong defense for the separation of powers doctrine:
The political liberty of the subject is a tranquility of mind, arising
from the opinion each person has of his safety. In order to have
this liberty, it is requisite the government be so constituted as
26. LOcKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Laslett ed. 1960).
27. Parker, supra note 20, at 1013.
28. 2 LoCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT CHAP. XI §134-160 (Laslett ed.
1960).
29. Parker, supra note 20, at 1015.
30. Fairlie, supra note 21, at 396 ("His [Montesquieu's] classification was
clearly based on a study of the English Government and of Locke.").
31. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (Nugent trans. D'Alembert ed.
1873).
32. Radin, The Doctrine of the Separation of Powers in Seventeenth Cen-
tury Controversies, U. PA. L. REV. 842, 843 (1938).
33. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, Book XI, Ch. 6 (Nugent trans.
D'Alembert ed. 1873).
[Vol. 11:175
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one man need not be afraid of another.
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the
same person, or in the same body of magistracy, there can be then
no liberty, because apprehensions may arise, lest the same mon-
arch or senate should enact tyranical laws, to execute them in a
tyrannical manner.
Again, there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not sepa-
rated from the legislative and executive powers. Were it joined
with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be
exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the leg-
islator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might
behave with all the violence of an oppressor.84
Because they studied these writers, the founding fathers had a
strong belief in separation of powers. 5 In fact, separation of pow-
ers became a principal part of "informed" public opinion in the
American colonies.86 The separation of powers doctrine became so
widely accepted in the American colonies that at the Constitu-
tional Convention, the tripartite form of government was part of
the initial proposal for a Constitution made by Virginia.3 7 This ini-
tial proposal was sent to a "Committee of Detail" merely for the
purpose of filling in details of organization of the proposed three
branches. 8 However, after the drafting of the Constitution had
been the completed and the final document submitted for ratifica-
tion, it became clear that the particular form which separation of
powers had taken in the new Constitution was not recognized by
some persons. 9 There was also some popular opposition to ratifica-
tion.40 Consequently, a series of papers, titled The Federalist, were
written by the Hamilton, Madison and Jay."1
Madison's task in The Federalist letters 47 to 51 was to ex-
plain and defend the doctrine of separation of powers in the form
which it had taken in the proposed Constitution and persuade the
populace that separation of powers had been included as part of
34. Id.
35. Blumoff, Separation of Powers and the Origins of the Appointment
Clause, 37 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1037, 1058 (1987).
36. Sharp, supra note 15, at 394.
37. 1 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 30-31 (1937).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Kurland, The Rise and Fall of the "Doctrine" of Separation of Powers,
85 MICH. L. REV. 592, 597 (1986)..
41. Sharp, supra note 15, at 406.
1989l
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the Constitution."2 Some persons believed that the form of separa-
tion of powers which had been incorporated into the Constitution
was radically different from the doctrine described by Locke and
Montesquieu. s Madison himself recognized that there were serious
objections to the proposed document. The most important argu-
ment made against the proposed Constitution was that total sepa-
ration of powers had not been observed.," Thus, Madison's princi-
pal tasks were generally to explain separation of powers and to
defend the form which that doctrine had taken in the proposed
Constitution.
B. Madison's General Explanation of Separation of Powers
Madison emphatically made the point that problems of sepa-
ration of power were difficult to handle. He explained that the sep-,
aration doctrine was difficult to articulate and draft into a consti-
tution because it is almost impossible to define clearly what ought
to constitute the entire structure of the three branches of govern-
ment. 5 Madison found it even more difficult to define the respec-
tive powers of the three branches. 6 In any event, Madison made it
clear that incorporation of separation of powers concepts was a
central objective of the drafters of the Constitution:
The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judici-
ary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and
whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pro-
nounced the very definition of tyranny. Were the federal Consti-
42. Id. at 406, n. 53.
43. Kurland, supra note 40, at 597.
44. One of the principal objections inculcated by the more respectable
adversaries to the Constitution, is its supposed violation of the political
maxim, that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments ought
to be separate and distinct. In the structure of the [proposed] federal
government, no regard, it is said, seems to have been paid to this essen-
tial precaution in favor of liberty.
THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 323 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
45. THE FEDERALIST No. 307, at 236, 237 (J. Madison).
46. Experience has instructed us that no skill in the science of Govern-
ment has yet been able to discriminate and define, with sufficient cer-
tainty, its three great provinces, the Legislative, Executive, and Judici-
ary; or even the privileges and powers of the different Legislative
branches. Questions daily occur in the course of practice, which prove the
obscurity which reigns in these subjects, and which puzzle the greatest
adepts in political science.
THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 235 (J. Madison).
[Vol. 11:175
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tution therefore really chargeable with this accumulation of
power or with a mixture of powers having a dangerous tendency
to such an accumulation, no further arguments would be neces-
sary to inspire a universal reprobation of the system. I persuade
myself however, that it will be made apparent to everyone, that
the charge cannot be supported, and that the maxim on which it
relies, has been totally misconceived and misapplied. In order to
form correct ideas on this important subject, it will be proper to
investigate the sense, in which the preservation of liberty re-
quires, that the three great departments of power should be sepa-
rate and distinct.
47
Madison defended the separation principles written into the Con-
stitution by an appeal to the reasoning of Montesquieu:
The reasons on which Montesquieu grounds his maxim are a fur-
ther demonstration of his meaning. 'When the legislative and ex-
ecutive powers are united in the same person or body,' says he,
'there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest the
same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute
them in a tyrannical manner.' Again, 'were the power of judging
joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject
would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then
be the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge
might behave with all the violence of an oppressor. '48
However, as pointed out above,49 the real argument was not
about whether separation of powers should be included in the Con-
stitution, but whether as drafted separation had been incorporated
into the proposed Constitution. Madison devoted most of The
Federalist letters from 47 to 51 to demonstrating that it was.5"
The principal concern of persons who opposed the proposed
Consititution was "blending," which was the term used to describe
the exercise of several powers by one branch or the exercise of
powers which might be thought to belong to one branch by an-
other. The power of the President in the Constitution to veto legis-
lation was an example of blending: the executive was exercising a
power which affected the enactment of legislation, a power which
concededly belonged to the legislature. Madison's defense drew on
Montesquieu, who had not absolutely precluded blending, but pre-
47. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 324 (J. Madison).
48. Id. at 326-27.
49. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
50. THE FEDERALIST No. 47-51, at 323-353 (J. Madison).
19891
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cluded only those mixtures of functions where one branch exer-
cised the whole power of another branch. 51 In fact, Madison
demonstrated at length that Montesquieu had used the British
Constitution as his model and that particular constitution was fil-
led with examples of blending.52 Madison explained power has "an
encroaching nature. '5 3 In using this description, he was probably
referring to the danger of power being gathered by the legislature:
In a government, where numerous and extensive prerogatives are
placed in the hands of an hereditary monarch, the executive de-
partment is very justly regarded as the source of danger, and
watched with all the jealousy which a zeal for liberty ought to
inspire .... But in a representative republic, where the executive
magistracy is carefully limited both in the extent and the dura-
tion of its power; and where the legislative power is exercised by
an assembly, which is inspired by a supposed influence over the
people with an intrepid confidence in its own strength; . . . it is
51. "... [T]he fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted...
[W]here the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which
possess the whole power of another department." THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 325-
326 (J. Madison).
52. The oracle who is always consulted and cited on this subject, is the
celebrated Montesquieu....
On the slightest view of the British Constitution we must perceive,
that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments are by no
means totally separate and distinct from each other. The executive mag-
istrate forms an integral part of the legislative authority. He alone has
the prerogative of making treaties with foreign sovereigns, which when
made have, under certain limitations, the force of legislative acts. All the
members of the judiciary department are appointed by him; can be re-
moved by him on the address of the two Houses of Parliament, and form,
when he pleases to consult them, one of his constitutional councils. One
branch of the legislative department forms also, a great constitutional
council to the executive chief; as on another hand, it is the sole deposi-
tary of judicial power in cases of impeachment, and is invested with the
supreme appellate jurisdiction, in all other cases. The judges again are so
far connected with the legislative department, as often to attend and
participate in its deliberations, though not admitted to a legislative vote.
From these facts by which Montesquieu was guided it may clearly be
inferred, that in saying "there can be no liberty where the legislative and
executive powers are united in the same person, or body of magistrates;"
or "if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and ex-
ecutive powers," he did not mean that these departments ought to have
no partial agency in, or no control over the acts of each other.
Id. at 324-25.
53. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 332 (J. Madison).
[Vol. 11:175
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against the enterprising ambition of this department, that the
people ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their
precautions.
The legislative department derives a superiority in our gov-
ernments from other circumstances. Its constitutional powers be-
ing at once more extensive and less susceptible of precise limits, it
can, with the greater facility, mask under complicated and indi-
rect measures, the encroachments which it makes on the co-ordi-
nate departments."'
One of the most important parts of Madison's defense of the
Constitution was his argument in favor of blending of powers.
Madison argued that Montesquieu had not advocated absolute
separation, nor had the American states in their constitutions fol-
lowed absolute separation. 5 Moreover, mere prohibitions on paper
against one branch exceeding the powers assigned to it had been
wholly ineffective.5 6 He therefore undertook the task of fashioning
a practical means to enforce separation of powers.5 In order to
preserve separation of powers, paper barriers in constitutions are
not sufficient:
To what expedient then shall we finally resort for maintaining in
practice the necessary partition of power among the, several de-
partments, as laid down in the Constitution? .. .[T]he great se-
curity against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the
same department, consists in giving to those who administer each
department, the necessary Constitutional means, and personal
motives, to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for
defence must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate
to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract
54. Id. at 333-334 (J. Madison).
55. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 327-330 (J. Madison).
56. Id. at 327.
57. ... [T]he next and most difficult task, is to provide some practical
security for each against the invasion of the others .... Will it be suffi-
cient to mark with precision the boundaries of these departments in the
Constitution of the government, and to trust to these parchment barriers
against the encroaching spirit of power? This is the security which ap-
pears to have been principally relied on by the compilers of most of the
American Constitutions. But experience assures us, that the efficacy of
the provision has been greatly over-rated; and that some more adequate
defence is indispensibly necessary for the more feeble, against the more
powerful members of the government.
THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 332-33 (J. Madison).
19891
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ambition.58
It is clear that Madison explained and defended the form which
separation of powers took in the Constitution, but he also sug-
gested changes from earlier writers and made a major change of
the separation doctrine itself in the Constitution."9 He began with
an explanation of the separation doctrine which defined it as a de-
vice to control power in order to preserve individual liberty.60 He
then explained that for pragmatic reasons, in operation, separation
would only work if powers were not hermetically sealed off but
slightly shared between branches, so that each branch would act as
a check on the other."1 This system of checks and balances, fueled
by the competing ambitions of persons holding governmental of-
fice, was the practical device which translated the abstract and ab-
solute doctrine of separation of powers into a workable device.
Madison is justly celebrated for his creation and defense of the
check and balance device. What is overlooked, however, is his idea
that blending of powers is necessary in a constitution which
utilizes separation of powers, because it is impossible to precisely
define powers.
III. THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE
The Constitution is full of ambiguities and the question of the
relationships among the three branches of the federal government
has been, and continues to be, one of the most perplexing of these
ambiguities. When faced with ambiguity in interpreting the Con-
stitution, the Supreme Court, and indeed any court, first must look
to the constitutional text for a solution. 2 The text of Article II,
Clause 2, which provides for the executive appointment and re-
moval power, provides as follows:
... [The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and
all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are
not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established
by Law: but the Congress may by law vest the Appointment of
58. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 347-349 (J. Madison).
59. Kurland, supra note 40, at 597.
60. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 324 (J. Madison).
61. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47-48, at 324-338 (J. Madison).
62. Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of Powers Dis-
putes, 64 B.U. L. REv. 109, 122-123 (1984).
[Vol. 11:175
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such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President
alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments."
This text is less than clear and a mere reading of it in isolation
produces many questions. Not surprisingly, the power of the exec-
utive branch to remove officers under this clause has been the fo-
cus of considerable controversy ever since it was drafted. For ex-
ample, the removal power was involved indirectly in the early
Supreme Court case of Marbury v. Madison.4 Also, one of the ear-
liest actions of the first United States Congress involved the ques-
tion of the removal power of the executive branch. 5 Even a cur-
sory reading of the Appointments Clause reveals many questions.
For example, who are "Officers of the United States?" Who are the
"Officers . . . whose Appointments are not herein otherwise pro-
vided for?" Who are "inferior Officers" whose appointment the
Congress can control or delegate? The most important question is
not covered by express language in the quoted constitutional
clause, nor anywhere in the Constitution: what are the removal
powers of the executive and legislature, respectively?
The text of the Constitution does not expressly give the execu-
tive the power to remove. In The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton
had the job of defending the Appointment Clause, and he also ad-
dressed the related problem of removal. He wrote:
63. U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
64. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). President Jefferson refused to honor ap-
pointment of federal Magistrate Marbury, who had been appointed by Jefferson's
predecessor, President Adams. At bar, counsel in their argument linked the an-
swer to the question of whether the commission had to be delivered to the ques-
tion of whether President Jefferson had the power to remove Marbury:
Where an officer is removable at the will of the executive, the cir-
cumstance which completes his appointment is of no concern; because
the act is at any time revocable; and the commission may be arrested, if
still in the office. But when the officer is not removable at the will of the
executive, the appointment is not revocable, and cannot be annulled. It
has conferred legal rights which cannot be resumed ....
Mr. Marbury, then, since his commission was signed by the Presi-
dent, and sealed by the Secretary of State, was appointed; and as the law
creating the office, gave the officer a right to hold for five years, indepen-
dent of the executive, the appointment was not revocable, but vested in
the officer legal rights, which are protected by the laws of his country.
Id. at 162.
65. Corwin, Tenure of Office and the Removal Power under the Constitu-
tion, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 353, 360-363 (1927). Madison introduced a bill which pro-
vided that the head of the Department of Foreign Affairs was to be "removable
from office by the President of the United States." Id. at 360.
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It has been mentioned as one of the advantages to be expected
from the co-operation of the Senate, in the business of appoint-
ments, that it would contribute to the stability of the administra-
tion. The consent of that body would be necessary to displace as
well as to appoint. A change of the chief magistrate therefore
would not occasion so violent or so general a revolution in the
officers of the government, as might be expected if he were the
sole disposer of offices.66
The principal debate in connection with Article II was over the
nature of the appointment power. Hamilton defended the virtues
of nomination by the executive.67 He argued that the principal ad-
vantage of executive appointment would be that the danger of ex-
cessive patronage, which a multimember political body like Con-
gress would inevitably fall into, would be reduced.68 He also argued
that the provisions of Article II would prevent the Senate from
having too much power or influence over the executive.6 9 There
was serious doubt about Article II, and much was written against it
by the antifederalists. 0
The arguments in The Federalist71 and The Antifederalist 72
papers were merely a reflection of the same dissention which had
gripped the Constitutional Convention. Indeed, the problem of
how to handle appointments under the Constitution was one of the
most divisive problems faced at the Convention. For example, one
suggestion was to permit the legislature to appoint all judges.73
The counter position was taken by some at the Convention that
the executive alone should do all appointing. 4 Others argued that
the power of appointment was too great to be held by a single per-
son. 75 After several days of debate on the subject, Madison unsuc-
cessfully attempted a compromise which consisted of nomination
by the President with concurrence by a specified minority of the
66. THE FEDERALIST No. 77 at 515 (A. Hamilton).
67. THE FEDERALIST No. 76 (A. Hamilton).
68. Id.
69. THE FEDERALIST No. 77 (A. Hamilton).
70. See THE ANTI-FEDERALIST at 214 (H. Storing ed.) (M. Dry ed., 1985).
71. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 75-77, at 503-521 (A. Hamilton).
72. THE ANTI-FEDERALIST 210-221 (H. Storing ed.) (M. Dry ed. 1985).
73. J. MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 108-109 (Scott ed.
1970).
74. 1 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 119
(Yale ed. 1966).
75. Id.
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Senate.76 The Convention deadlocked and Madison pleaded for a
spirit of compromise.7' The members of the entire Convention
then rewrote the proposal of the Committee of Detail on appoint-
ments and a vigorous debate with numerous amendments ulti-
mately produced the Appointments Clause in its present form. 8
The exchanges and debate on the Appointments Clause were dic-
tated by "partisan politics" and "practical necessity" as part of a
"struggle over the proper allocation of powers. '7 9 The resulting
language was clearly a compromise between those persons who de-
sired to give the entire power to appoint and remove to the execu-
tive and those who wished to give the entire power to the
legislature.
IV. THE DECISION OF 1789
The extent of the disagreement over the power to appoint and
remove was revealed in the year after the adoption of the Constitu-
tion. On May 18, 1789, in the House of Representatives of the First
Congress, James Madison moved for the establishment of three ex-
ecutive departments to deal with foreign affairs. Each department
would be directed by a secretary. This secretary was to be ap-
pointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate; however, the language of the proposed statute provided that
he could be removed by the President alone.80 This executive re-
moval provision of the proposed statute prompted an acrimonious
debate, as it should have, since several of the participants in the
First Congress of 1789 also had been signatories of the Constitu-
tion and since the matter of appointment had been the subject of
long debate in the Constitutional Convention.81 Perhaps as a result
of the debate, the framers left the the Appointments Clause full of
ambiguities. The matter of removal, except for impeachment, was
also left unsettled by the constitutional text. The proposed statu-
tory language, however, appeared to recognize a removal power in
the President acting alone.2 It permitted the executive branch to
76. MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, 373-380 (Scott ed. 1970).
77. Id. at 398-409.
78. Id. at 680-683. For a complete review of the history of the Appointments
Clause, see Blumoff, supra note 35, at 1067-1068.
79. Blumoff, supra note 35, at 1078.
80. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 370 (1789).
81. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
82. ". . . [T]here shall be established . . . the Department of Foreign Af-
fairs, at the head of which there shall be an officer . .. to be removable by the
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exercise a substantial power which had notbeen mentioned in the
text of the Constitution and which the framers had been unable to
settle. 3 The congressional activity in connection with this bill has
come to be known as "The Decision of 1789."
After the bill was introduced, a protracted debate occurred.84
That debate was joined over the issue of whether the President
had inherent removal power. Several approaches to that question
soon became apparent. One was that the power of removal was a
plenary power which belonged entirely to the President and that
this position was the intent of the framers of the Constitution. 5 A
second position in the debate was that the Constitution provided
that the removal power was shared by the President and legisla-
ture acting in concert. 6 A third position was that the Constitution
did not settle the question of removal, and it was therefore within
the power of the legislature to provide for it under the necessary
and proper clause.8 7 After several days of debate, the House voted
on this language, which provided that the President acting alone
had the power to remove the new Secretary of Foreign Affairs.8 8 It
was approved. 9 However, several days later a motion was made to
amend the language of the statute. This proposed amendment in-
cluded the provision that "whenever the principal officer shall be
removed from office by the President... ."90 This amendment mo-
tion ultimately passed the House. After more acrimonious debate,
the Senate passed the amendment on a tie vote which was broken
by the Vice President.9'
V. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON REMOVAL
A. Marbury v. Madison
Although celebrated in American Supreme Court history as
the decision which established judicial review, the controversy in
President." 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 370-371 (1789).
83. See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
84. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 460-608 (1789).
85. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 373 (1789) (Rep. Benson).
86. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 372 (1789) (Rep. Smith).
87. Corwin, supra note 65, at 360-361.
88. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 606-607 (1789).
89. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 599 (1789).
90. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 601 (1789).
91. Burkoff, Appointment and Removal Under the Federal Constitution:
The Impact of Buckley v. Valeo, 22 WAYNE L. REV. 1335, 1383 (1976).
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Marbury v. Madison92 involved presidential removal power. In
Marbury, President John Adams appointed Marbury Justice of the
Peace for the District of Columbia. President Adams signed a com-
mission naming Marbury for a term of five years, but his term of
office expired before that commission was delivered. Thomas Jef-
ferson, the next President, refused to deliver the commission. Mar-
bury then sought a writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court.
The Court did not issue the writ because the statute which pur-
ported to confer the power to issue mandamus on the Supreme
Court was unconstitutional." Chief Justice Marshall, in response
to argument of counsel stated:
The discretion of the executive is to be exercised until the ap-
pointment has been made. But having once made the appoint-
ment, his power over the office is terminated in all cases, where
by law the officer is not removable by him. The right to the office
is then in the person appointed, and he has the absolute, uncon-
ditional power of accepting or rejecting it.
Mr. Marbury, then, since his commission was signed by the
President, and sealed by the Secretary of State, was appointed;
and as the law creating the office, gave the officer a right to hold
it for five years, independent of the executive, the appointment
was not revocable, but vested in the officer legal rights, which are
protected by the laws of his country.94
Although an argument can be made that this language was dictum,
one analyst has made the point that if the President had the power
to remove Marbury, it would not have been necessary for the
Court to decide the constitutionality of the mandamus statute
which is the conceded holding of the case. 5 Thus, a necessary im-
plication of the Marbury decision is that presidential removal
power is limited with respect to non-executive officers. The Mar-
bury decision displays Chief Justice Marshall's understanding of
the removal power. In discussing the Decision of 1789,6 Chief Jus-
tice Marshall stated:
By the Constitution of the United States, the President is in-
vested with certain important political powers, in the exercise of
92. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
93. Id. at 172.
94. Id. at 162.
95. Note, The Limits of Presidential Removal Power, 35 OHIO ST. L. J. 513,
517 (1974).
96. See supra notes 80-91 and accompanying text.
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which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to
his country in his political character and to his own conscience.
To aid him in the performance of these duties, he is authorized to
appoint certain officers, who act by his authority, and in conform-
ity with his orders. In such cases their acts are his acts; and
whatever discretion may be used, still there exists and can exist
no power to control that discretion. The subjects are political.
They respect the Nation, not individual rights, and, being en-
trusted to the executive, the decision of the executive is conclu-
sive. The application of this remark will be perceived by ad-
verting to the act of Congress for establishing the department of
Foreign Affairs. This officer as his duties were prescribed by that
act, is to conform precisely to the will of the President. He is the
mere organ by whom that will is to be communicated. 7
In this passage, Chief Justice Marshall indicated that his under-
standing of the constitutional removal power of the President is
almost wholly determined by the nature or character of the partic-
ular office involved.98 For example, certain positions are clearly ex-
ecutive or political in nature, such as those which deal with foreign
affairs. In this arena, the President has absolute removal power. In
the case of a minor judicial officer, such as Justice of the Peace,
Marbury, who is in no way a member of the executive branch or a
purely political officer, the President's power of removal is circum-
scribed. Chief Justice Marshall's reasoning that the Marbury deci-
sion did not prevent Congress from appointing minor officers was
based upon his understanding of the Decision of 1789.1"
B. Ex Parte Hennen
In the case of Ex parte Hennen,0 ° the law clerk for a federal
district court judge in Louisiana brought a mandamus action to
seek reappointment after being removed by a judge of that court.
The clerk had been appointed pursuant to a federal statute which
gave the courts the power to appoint their clerks.1"' Congress had
enacted this law, of course, under its power to appoint inferior of-
ficers under the Appointments Clause.1 0 2 This statute did not fix
97. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 165.
98. Corwin, supra note 65, at 373-374.
99. Id. at 372-373.
100. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230 (1839).
101. Id. at 258.
102. See supra note 63 and accompanying text for the provisions of the Ap-
pointments clause.
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the tenure or term of office of the clerks. The Court reasoned that:
[a]ll offices, the tenure of which is not fixed by the Constitution
or limited by law, must be held either during good behaviour, or
(which is the same thing in contemplation of law) during the life
of the incumbent; or must be held at the will and discretion of
some department of the government, and subject to removal at
pleasure.'"3
The Court then mentioned the maxim that the power to remove
followed the power to appoint and referred to the Presidential re-
moval power even though presidential power was not involved in
the Hennen case:
In the absence of all Constitutional provision, or statutory regula-
tion, it would seem to be a sound and necessary rule, to consider
the power of removal as incident to the power of appointment
.... This [earlier disputes over removal] related, however, to
the power of the President to remove officers appointed with the
concurrence of the Senate: and the great question was, whether
the removal was to be by the President alone, or with the concur-
rence of the Senate both constituting the appointing power. No
one denied the power of the President and Senate jointly, to re-
move, where the tenure of the office was not fixed by the Consti-
tution; which was a full recognition of the principle that the
power of removal was incident to the power of appointment. But
it was very early adopted, as the practical construction of the
Constitution, that this power was vested in the President alone."'
However, with regard to clerks in Hennen's position, the court
went on to reason that:
These clerks fall under that class of inferior officers, the appoint-
ment of which the Constitution authorizes Congress to vest in the
head of the department. The same rule, as to the power of re-
moval, must be applied to offices where the appointment is vested
in the President alone. The nature of the power, and the control
over the officer appointed, does not at all depend on the source
from which it emanates. The execution of the power depends
upon the authority of law, and not upon the agent who is to ad-
minister it. And the Constitution has authorized Congress, in cer-
tain cases, to vest this power in the President alone, in the Courts
of law, or in the heads of departments; and all inferior officers
appointed under each, by authority of law, must hold their office
103. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 259.
104. Id.
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at the discretion of the appointing power. Such is the settled us-
age and practical construction of the Constitution and laws,
under which these offices are held."'8
The extensive quotes above from the Hennen opinion are nec-
essary in order to illustrate the meandering reasoning of the Court
and to appraise the authoritativeness of the opinion upon the
question of the removal power. There are several problems with
the Court's reasoning in the case. First, the statements of the
Court regarding presidential removal power are dictum. They have
nothing to do with a case involving the removal of a judicial clerk
by a federal judge, and are simply not necessary or relevant to the
decision before the Court.
Second, the theory invoked by the relator in the case was that
the intent of the Congress in enacting the Judiciary Act of 1789
was to adopt English common law practice as to the judicial power
to appoint and remove. Such practice or power had been exten-
sively used in the American colonies and was contemplated by the
drafters of the Judiciary Act of 1789.101 Evidently, the attorneys
trying the case did not perceive the relevance of presidential re-
moval power. Even more importantly, these arguments shed light
on the genesis of the Court's insistence that the power to remove
always and necessarily follows the power to appoint. A principal
part of the argument made by the relator was that the appoint-
ment power is an inherently "naked" power, which, once it has
been exercised, utterly exhausts the appointer's power relative to
the employee. 10 7 The Hennen Court's use of the maxim that the
power to remove follows the power to appoint was made in re-
sponse to the relator's strongly argued English law position. The
Court in the Hennen decision took great pains to reject this maxim
and the Court's reasoning at least indirectly involved looking at
105. Id. at 260.
106. In the country from which we have borrowed so many of our consti-
tutional and legal doctrines, the same practice extensively prevailed. It is
believed it generally existed among the colonies. Wherever it did prevail,
the power of appointment was considered as a naked power, which was
exhausted by the act itself; and then slumbered until another vacancy
awakened it again to life.
As a general principle of the common law, in all cases of appointments
under powers, the appointment is not revocable unless expressly made so
at the creation of the power.
Id. at 236.
107. Id. at 236-237.
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the history of the Appointments Clause. The Hennen Court rea-
soned that although the Constitution is silent about removal, Con-
gress in the Decision of 1789 had adopted a "practical" construc-
tion of the Constitution which vested the complete power to
remove in the President."0 8
Third, the Court in Hennen recognized a distinction between
the situation before it and the issue of Presidential removal power
in holding that the power to appoint clerks is vested exclusively in
the district court and the Supreme Court therefore has no power
to issue mandamus.' 0 ' The import of this holding is that the Su-
preme Court and no other branch of the government has the
power to interfere with the removal power of the district court. As
the Hennen Court stated, the appointment and removal power in
the Constitution was "no doubt intended to be exercised by the
department of government to which the officer to be appointed
most appropriately belonged."" 0 This principle applies to the
power to remove, as well, and means that when Congress has the
power under the Constitution to delegate the power to appoint em-
ployees to a particular branch or department, as it does in connec-
108. It cannot, for a moment, be admitted, that it was the intention of
the Constitution, that those offices which are denominated inferior offices
should be held during life. And if removable at pleasure, by whom is
such removal to be made? In the absence of all Constitutional provision,
or statutory regulation, it would seem to be a sound and necessary rule,
to consider the power of removal as incident to the power of appoint-
ment. This power of removal from office was a subject much disputed,
and upon which a great diversity of opinion was entertained in the early
history of this government. This related, however, to the power of the
President to remove officers appointed with the concurrence of the Sen-
ate; and the great question was, whether the removal was to be by the
President alone, or with the concurrence of the Senate both constituting
the appointing power. No one denied the power of the President and
Senate jointly, to remove, where the tenure of the office was not fixed by
the Constitution, that this power was vested in the President alone. And
such would appear to have been the legislative construction of the Con-
stitution. For in the organization of the three great departments of state,
war and treasury, in the year 1789, provision is made for the appoint-
ment of a subordinate officer by the head of the department, who should
have the charge and custody of the records, books, and papers appertain-
ing to the office, when the head of the department should be removed
from the office of the President of the United States.
Id. at 259 (citing 1 Story, 5. 31. 47).
109. Id. at 261.
110. Id. at 258.
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tion with inferior officers under the Appointment Clause, and
makes a delegation without fixing a term of office for the employee,
then several consequences follow. First, the employee is hired at
will and has no judicially recognizable personal right to a particu-
lar term in office. Second, only the particular department or
branch of which he is a part and to whom the appointment power
has been delegated by Congress can remove him, for such branch
or department is the only "appropriate" removing authority. These
conclusions would appear obvious from a careful reading of the
case; however, as will be seen, the Hennen opinion has been relied
upon as precedent to support several contradictory versions of
presidential appointment and removal power.
C. Ex Parte Siebold
The next major case involving appointment and removal
power is Ex Parte Siebold.111 In Siebold, a federal statute con-
ferred power on federal circuit court judges to appoint election
commissioners for federal elections. The statute was intended to
work in conjunction with state statutes on elections and partially
preempt state power. The petitioners made several arguments.
Their principal arguments involved several variations on the the-
ory that although the federal government had the power to pre-
empt the states, it could exercise this power only exclusively or
totally, and not partially." 2 In a closely related vein, the petition-
ers also argued that the power to keep the peace belonged to the
111. 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
112. The general positions contended for by the counsel of the petitioners are
stated in their brief as follows:
We shall attempt to eastablish [sic] these propositions:
1. That the power to make regulations as to the times, places, and man-
ner of holding elections for representatives in Congress, granted to Con-
gress by the Constitution, is an exclusive power when exercised by
Congress.
2. That this power, when so exercised, being exclusive of all interference
therein by the States, must be so exercised as not to interfere with or
come in collision with regulations presented in that behalf by the States,
unless it provides for the complete control over the whole subject over
which it is exercised.
3. That when put in operation by Congress it must take the place of all
State regulations of the subject regulated, which subject must be entirely
and completely controlled and provided for by Congress.
Id. at 382-383.
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states alone."13 The petitioners then challenged, almost as an after-
thought, the power of the circuit courts under the legislation to
appoint election commissioners. These officers who were not mem-
bers of the judiciary; therefore, petitioners argued that separation
of powers had been violated, for the judicial branch was exercising
executive power." 4 The Supreme Court stated that:
It is no doubt usual and proper to vest the appointment of
inferior officers in that department of the government, executive
or judicial, or in that particular executive department to which
the duties of such officers appertain. But there is no absolute re-
quirement to his effect in the Constitution; and, if there were, it
would be difficult in many cases to determine to which depart-
ment an office properly belonged." 5
The Court distinguished the Hennen decision by stating that the
position taken by the Hennen Court that the appointing power in
the clause referred to
"was no doubt intended to be exercised by the department of the
government to which the official to be appointed most appropri-
ately belonged" was- not intended to define the constitutional
power of Congress in this regard, but rather to express the law or
rule by which it [Congress] should be governed."' 6
In other words, the statement in Hennen referring to the
power of appointment and removal by the "appropriate" branch
was not an implied constitutional stricture which defined the only
branch which could exercise a particular power. Instead, it de-
113. Somewhat akin to the argument which has been considered is the
objection that the deputy marshals authorized by the act of Congress to
be created and to attend the elections are authorized to keep the peace;
and that this is a duty which belongs to the State authorities alone. It is
argued that the preservation of peace and good order in society is not
within the powers confided to the government of the United States, but
belongs exclusively to the States.
Id. at 394.
114. Finally, it is objected that the act of Congress imposes upon the
Circuit Court duties not judicial, in requiring them to appoint the super-
visors of election, whose duties, it is alleged, are entirely executive in
their character. It is contended that no power can be conferred upon the
courts of the United States to appoint officers whose duties are not con-
nected with the judicial department of the government.
Id. at 397.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 398.
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scribed a power of Congress to vest the appointment and removal
power of inferior officers in whatever branch is appropriate, so long
as the congressional placement of that power does not involve an
"incongruity."'1 7 Although the Siebold Court did not describe what
would constitute an "incongruity" on the part of Congress in be-
stowing the. appointment and removal power, the Court did state
that "[ilt cannot be affirmed that the appointment of the officers
in question could, with any greater propriety, and certainly not
with equal regard to convenience, have been assigned to any other
depositary of official power capable of exercising it."118 In Siebold,
a leading case on the subject of the appointment and removal
power, there was no reference to history, except for the reference
to the Hennen opinion for the purpose of distinguishing it. There
was no attempt even to give any reasons for distinguishing the am-
biguous language of Hennen, historical, or otherwise. And thus, the
breadth of the Hennen decision, which suggested that only the
branch of which an inferior officer was a part had full power under
the Constitution to appoint and remove, appeared to be the law on
removal at that time and after the Siebold decision.
D. Myers v. United States
In 1926, the Supreme Court decided the case of Myers v.
United States," 9 which has been regarded as one of the major
cases on executive removal power. A United States statute pro-
vided that postmasters ". . . shall be appointed and may be re-
moved by the President by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate and shall hold their offices for four years unless sooner re-
moved or suspended according to law. 1 20 Myers, the postmaster
for Portland, Oregon, was removed by the President without action
by the Senate. The court of claims denied Myers' claim for wages,
and the Supreme Court affirmed in a majority opinion written by
Chief Justice Taft. The question, according to the majority opin-
ion, was ".... whether under the Constitution the President has the
exclusive power of removing executive officers of the United States
whom he has appointed by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate." 2'
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
120. 19 Stat. 80, 81 (1876), U.S. Comp. Stat. (1916) §1790.
121. Myers, 272 U.S. at 106.
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The principal government argument was that under Article II
of the Constitution, the power of removal of the President for of-
ficers appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate was
"full and complete" without the requirement of consent by the
Senate.122
In an elaborate majority opinion, Chief Justice Taft concluded
in broad and sweeping terms as follows:
Our conclusion on the merits, sustained by the arguments before
stated, is that article 2 grants to the President the executive
power of the government-i.e., the general administrative control
of those executing the laws, including the power of appointment
and removal of executive officers-a conclusion confirmed by his
obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully executed; that
article 2 excluded the exercise of legislative power by Congress to
provide for appointments and removals, except only as granted
therein to Congress in the matter of inferior offices; that Congress
is only given power to provide for appointments and removals of
inferior officers after it has vested, and on condition that it does
vest, their appointment in other authority than the President
with the Senate's consent; that the provisions of the second sec-
tion of article 2, which blend action by the legislative branch, or
by part of it, in the work of the executive, are limitations to be
strictly construed, and not to be extended by implication; that
the President's power of removal is further established as an inci-
dent to his specifically enumerated function of appointment by
and with the advice of the Senate, but that such incident does not
by implication extend to removals the Senate's power of checking
appointments; and, finally, that to hold otherwise would make it
impossible for the President, in case of political or other differ-
ence with the Senate or Congress, to take care that the laws be
faithfully executed.123
Thus, the constitutional language that the majority opinion ap-
pears to rest upon is the Article II provision that the President is
charged with the duty to see that the laws are faithfully executed.
Chief Justice Taft's analysis also relied upon a maxim of statutory
interpretation: that the power to remove is an incident of the
power to appoint."" However, the Chief Justice's principal sources
122. Id. at 108.
123. Id. at 163.
124. . . . [Tihe express recognition of the power of appointment in the
second section [of Article II] enforced this view on the well-approved
principle of constitutional and statutory construction that the power of
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for his sweeping support of an almost absolute executive removal
power were historical analysis and inference, since there is no ex-
press power of removal given to the President in the text of Article
II or elsewhere in the Constitution.12 5 His historical analysis con-
sisted of seeking the intent of the framers of the Constitution in
the Constitutional debates, in The Federalist Papers, and in an
examination of the Decision of 1789.
Chief Justice Taft acknowledged that there is no express pro-
vision for removal in the Constitution except through impeach-
ment.12 He then examined the proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention to ascertain if such a power was implied by the lan-
guage of the Constitution.' 7 He concluded that it was. He began
by observing that Edmund Randolph had, as part of the Virginia
Plan, introduced a resolution which gave to the President all of the
executive power of the Congress under the Articles of Confedera-
tion. "'28 Since the Congress, under the Articles of Confederation,
had exercised a power of removal, Chief Justice Taft therefore rea-
soned that the Virginia resolution was intended to include the
same power of removal by the executive under the United States
Constitution as had existed under the Articles of Confederation.'29
Chief Justice Taft conceded that the original resolution, which
was introduced by Randolph at the Constitutional Convention, was
modified by the Committee of the Whole and the Committee of
Detail at the Constitutional Convention. The Chief Justice's view
was that those committees simply made minor modifications or ig-
nored the removal provisions of the Virginia Plan. He reasoned
that the compromises later adopted at the Constitutional Conven-
removal of executive officers was incident to the power of appointment..
.This principle of statutory construction, then generally recognized, has
been recognized ever since .... The reason for the principle is that those
in charge of and responsible for administering functions of government,
who select their executive subordinates, need in meeting their responsi-
bility, to have the power to remove those whom they appoint.
Id. at 119.
125. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
126. Myers, 272 U.S. at 109.
127. Id. at 110-111.
128. Id. at 110.
129. ".... It [the resolution] gave to the executive "all the executive powers of
the Congress under the Confederation," which would seem therefore to have in-
tended to include the power of removal which had been exercised by that body as
incident to the power of appointment." Id. (This quotation is contradicted in the
following paragraph of the opinion.).
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tion focused upon such matters as representation by the large and
small states. According to Chief Justice Taft, the matter of re-
moval was never mentioned nor was it the subject of compromise
at the Constitutional Convention. Thus, he argued that the matter
of removal was in a fashion implicitly incorporated by reference
into the Constitution from the Virginia Plan. He reasoned that,
since it was not removed and was part of the Articles, then it must
have been the intent of the framers to include the extensive re-
moval power of the executive in the Constitution.
Chief Justice Taft found further evidence of the existence of
an absolute removal power in the executive in the Decision of
1789,130 introduced above.13 1 The Justice reasoned that, although
the House had debated the question, "[s]hall the words 'to be re-
movable by the President be struck out?", that issue was not set-
tled by the House.1 32 Instead, the result of the debate was that
Representative Benson offered a compromise motion which, after
describing the State Department and officers, provided for removal
with the phrase "whenever the principal officers shall be removed
from office by the President of the United States.1 33 This lan-
130. In the House of Representatives of the First Congress, on Tuesday,
May 18, 1789, Mr. Madison moved in the committee of the whole that
there should be established three executive departments, one of Foreign
Affairs, another of the Treasury, and a third of War, at the head of each
of which there should be a Secretary, to be appointed by the President
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and to be removable
by the President ....
On June 16, 1789, the House resolved itself into a committee of the
whole on a bill proposed by Mr. Madison for establishing an executive
department to be denominated the Department of Foreign Affairs, in
which the first clause, after stating the title of the officer and describing
his duties, had these words "to be removable from office by the President
of the United States." After a very full discussion the question was put:
"Shall the words 'to be removable by the President be struck out?'"
Id. at 111.
131. See supra notes 80-91 and accompanying text.
132. Myers, 272 U.S. at 112.
133. Id. at 113. The compromise motion of Representative Benson provided
in its entirety is as follows:
That there shall be in the State Department an inferior officer to be ap-
pointed by the said principal officer, and to be employed therein as he
shall deem proper, to be called the chief clerk in the Department of For-
eign Affairs, [sic] and who, whenever the principal officers shall be re-
moved from office by the President of the United States, or in any other
case of vacancy, shall, during such vacancy, have charge and custody of
all records, books and papers appertaining to said department.
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guage was to be used in place of previous language which provided
generally that the officers of the State Department were removable
by the President."" The amendment was carried by a vote of
thirty-one to nineteen. An amendment to remove the language "to
be removable by the President" from the earlier motion was also
carried.135 Chief Justice Taft concluded that this sequence of mo-
tion-debate-amendment-debate-passage-of-amendment established
several propositions very clearly. He argued that the history of the
motion established that the exact question on which the House
voted was the power of the President to remove and that there is
no doubt at all that the House vote was a legislative declaration
that the President alone had the power to remove officers of the
United States. 3 '
Chief Justice Taft analyzed the position of James Madison in
the debate.1 37 The Madisonian position, according to Chief Justice
Taft, consisted of several propositions. First, that Article II, in
granting executive power to the President, gave him the power to
appoint and remove. 138 Second, he argued that Madison recognized
and argued that the power of removal was incident to the power of
appointment. 139 Third, he also reasoned that Madison had argued
that the Congress had the power to make express provision for re-
moval under Article I, section 8.140
After further protracted discussion, Chief Justice Taft reached
several sweeping conclusions. First, he concluded that Article II
grants the President the power to appoint and remove executive
Id.
134. See supra note 80.
135. Myers, 272 U.S. at 113-114.
136. It is very clear from this history that the exact question which the
House voted upon was whether it should recognize and declare the power
of the President under the Constitution to remove the Secretary of For-
eign Affairs without the advice and consent of the Senate. That was what
the vote was taken for. Some effort has been made to question whether
the decision carries the result claimed for it, but there is not the slightest
doubt, after an examination of the record, that the vote was, and was
intended to be, a legislative declaration that the power to remove officers
appointed by the President and the Senate vested in the President alone,
and until the Johnson Impeachment trial in 1886 its, meaning was not
doubted even by those who questioned its soundness.
Id. at 114.
137. Id. at 113-114.
138. Id. at 115.
139. Id. at 119.
140. Id. at 125.
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officers as part of his duty to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed; second, that Congress has no power over appointments
and removals except in cases of inferior officers under the Appoint-
ment Clause; and third, that the power of Congress to provide for
appointment and removal of inferior officers in branches other
than the executive branch is a power which is in derogation of the
President's broad power and therefore must be narrowly con-
strued."" Chief Justice Taft's explanation for the breadth of this
holding was that:
In all such cases, the discretion to be exercised is that of the Pres-
ident in determining the national public interest and in directing
the action to be taken by his executive subordinates to protect it.
In this field his cabinet officers must do his will. He must place in
each member of his official family, and his chief executive subor-
dinates, implicit faith. The moment that he loses confidence in
the intelligence, ability, judgment or loyalty of any one of them,
he must have the power to remove him without delay. To require
him to file charges and submit them to the consideration of the
Senate might make impossible that unity and co-ordination in ex-
ecutive administration essential to effective action.
The duties of the heads of departments and bureaus in which
the discretion of the President is exercised and which we have
described, are the most important in the whole field of executive
141. Our conclusion on the merits, sustained by the arguments before
stated, is that Article II grants to the President the executive power of
the Government, i.e., the general administrative control of those execut-
ing the laws, including the power of appointment and removal of execu-
tive officers - a conclusion confirmed by his obligation to take care that
the laws be faithfully executed; that Article II excludes the exercise of
legislative power by Congress to provide for appointments and removals,
except only as granted therein to Congress in the matter of inferior of-
fices; that Congress is only given power to provide for appointments and
removals of inferior officers after it has vested, and on condition that it
does vest, their appointment in other authority than the President with
the Senate's consent; that the provisions of the second section of Article
II, which blend action by the legislative branch, or by part of it, in the
work of the executive, are limitations to be strictly construed and not be
be extended by implication; a that the President's power of removal is
further established as an incident to his specifically enumerated function
of appointment by and with the advice of the Senate, but that such inci-
dent does not by implication extend to removals the Senate's power of
checking appointments; and finally that to hold otherwise would make it
impossible for the President, in case of political or other differences with
the Senate or Congress, to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
Id. at 163-64.
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action of the Government. There is nothing in the Constitution
which permits a distinction between the removal of the head of a
department or a bureau, when he discharges a political duty of
the President or exercises his discretion, and the removal of exec-
utive officers engaged in the discharge of their other normal du-
ties. The imperative reasons requiring an unrestricted power to
remove the most important of his subordinates in their most im-
portant duties must, therefore, control the interpretation of the
Constitution as to all appointed by him.1"
Chief Justice Taft also explained his understanding of the im-
portance of his analysis of the Decision of 1789 in a manner which
is relevant for this Article. He admitted that the congressional de-
termination in the Decision of 1789, of whether the President had
absolute removal power was not binding on the Supreme Court.
Instead, because he agreed with the decision, he argued that it was
a persuasive precedent. He reasoned that it was a decision of the
First Congress, which was known to be making a decision which
would constitute a baseline for the subsequent course of the Re-
public and because many of the members of the First Congress had
been members of the Constitutional Convention, their opinions on
the intent of the framers and the meaning of the Constitutional
language were informed and forceful. 14 3 In this analysis of the De-
cision of 1789, the Chief Justice purposely used history to shed
light upon legislative intent and upon the meaning of constitu-
tional text. In fact, it is clear that one of the principal determi-
142. Id. at 134.
143. We have devoted much space to this discussion and decision of the
question of the Presidential power of removal in the First Congress, not
because a Congressional conclusion on a constitutional issue is conclu-
sive, but, first, because of our agreement with the reasons upon which it
was avowedly based; second, because this was the decision of the First
Congress, on a question of primary importance in the organization of the
Government, made within two years after the Constitutional Convention
and within a much shorter time after its ratification; and, third, because
that Congress numbered among its leaders those who had been members
of the Convention. It must necessarily constitute a precedent upon which
many future laws supplying the machinery of the new Government would
be based, and, if erroneous, it would be likely to evoke dissent and depar-
ture in future Congresses. It would come at once before the executive
branch of the Government for compliance, and might well be brought
before the judicial branch for a test of its validity. As, we shall see, it was
soon accepted as a final decision of the question by all branches of the
Government.
Id. at 136.
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nants of the Chief Justice's position was his understanding of the
intent of the framers, which he argued recognized the importance
of an absolute removal power to the effective functioning of the
executive branch. 14 Evaluation of the accuracy of the facts upon
which the Chief Justice relied and analysis of whether the conclu-
sions which he drew from those facts are justified or unfounded is
therefore an important method for assessing the persuasiveness
and authoritativeness of the Myers decision on the question of
presidential removal power.
In the Myers opinion, the historical facts which the Chief Jus-
tice relied upon were, simply put, incorrect. The inferences which
he drew from these incorrect facts and premises were therefore
also incorrect. The historical inaccuracies fall into three categories:
first, the Chief Justice's assertions about the debates at the Consti-
tutional Convention; second, his assertions about The Federalist
Papers; and third, his assertions about the Decision of 1789.
Justice McReynolds, dissenting in Myers, vigorously denied
the historical assumptions and facts about the Constitutional Con-
vention which the Chief Justice used in the majority opinion.145 He
reasoned that the Articles of Confederation, the predecessors to
the Constitution, did not contain any general grant of executive
power. He also reasoned that the powers which the executive did
exercise were carefully enumerated and limited." " He concluded
that "[i]n the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention no
hint can be found of any executive power except those definitely
enumerated or inferable therefrom or from the duty to enforce the
laws. '"1 7 Justice McReynolds' language speaks for itself. It suggests
144. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. (President must have the
power to direct the officers in the executive branch; and operation of executive
branch requires unity and cooperation).
145. Congress has long and vigorously asserted its right to restrict re-
movals and there has been no common executive practice based upon a
contrary view.... [T]he present [majority opinion] theory is that he may
override the declared will of that body [Congress]. This ... conflicts with
the history of the Constitution, with the ordinary rules of interpretation,
and with the construction approved by Congress .... To adopt it would
be revolutionary ....
Myers, 272 U.S. at 204 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
146. Id. (Justice McReynolds emphasized this point by quoting Madison
who, in reference to the power of the executive under the Articles of Confedera-
tion, argued that, "[tihe executives of the States are in general little more than
cyphers; the legislatures omnipotent." Id. at 204-05.).
147. Id. at 205 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
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that, except as to inferior officers, the power of removal is not an
enumerated power and therefore not part of the executive power.
His position is that this interpretation of executive power was so
obvious to the framers that they did not believe that they had to
state it.
Several writers have analyzed the historical origins of the Ap-
pointments Clause and its drafting at the Constitutional Conven-
tion.148 Their conclusions do not support Chief Justice Taft's his-
tory in the Myers opinion. None of these writers found any
discussion or debate of the removal power at the Constitutional
Convention. They did find, however, considerable discussion and
debate about the Appointments Clause and the intent of the fram-
ers in drafting it." 9 For example, there was protracted debate over
the appointment provisions of the Virginia Plan, introduced by
Randolph of Virginia, which provided for judicial appointments to
be made by the national legislature. This plan was rejected and a
compromise was proposed by Madison, which provided for nomi-
nation by the executive and confirmation by the Senate. Madison's
position prevailed, but:
[WIhat is curious about the debates.., is the near total absence
of theoretical discussion about the proper entity to exercise the
appointing power . . . . Rather, the debate focused largely on two
questions: Was the Executive or the Legislature more likely to
abuse its power? And which entity, the Executive or the Legisla-
ture, was more likely to be jealous and create discord if it was not
given a rule in the [appointment] process. 5 '
This led the analyst to several conclusions which completely un-
dercut Chief Justice Taft's position in the Myers opinion on the
subject of the intent of the framers.
... [W]hen one examines the history of the Appointments Clause,
however, one finds no evidence of shared convictions or purposes.
Indeed, but for the need to lodge an appointing power some-
where, one suspects that the delegates might never have agreed
on Article II, section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution ....
• . . Given the dynamics which generated the Appointment
Clause-partisan politics and unguided practical necessity-[an]
uncompromising view of the Clause is indefensible. On every side
the Clause was viewed, not as a "self-executing safeguard," but
148. Blumoff, supra note 35; Burkoff, supra note 91.
149. See, e.g., Blumoff, supra note 35, at 1062-1070.
150. Id. at 1066.
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rather as a permanent stop gap measure borne from what was
largely an unprincipled struggle over the proper allocation of
powers.151
In addition to error in his view of the framing of the Appoint-
ments Clause, Chief Justice Taft's version of the Decision of 1789
was badly flawed.15 The Decision of 1789 has already been gener-
ally analyzed. 5" As discussed above, it is often urged that the Deci-
sion of 1789 is one of the most important indicators of the intent
of the framers of the Constitution because so many of the repre-
sentatives who participated in that decision were signatories of the
Constitution. 5 4 Of course, that assertion is accurate for there were
many signers of the Constitution who were members of the First
Congress in 1789, including James Madison. However, the signifi-
cance of the overlap has been grossly overstated. It is one thing to
note that some members were the same and quite another to ex-
amine the positions of the members of the House of Representa-
tives, especially the members of the House who participated in the
"Great Debate." The leading critic of the Myers opinion did so and
concluded that the history employed by the Chief Justice was
nearly fictional. After examining the Decision of 1789, Edward
Corwin, one of the leading scholars on presidential power, con-
cluded that the House and the Senate both were divided into nu-
merous factions on the question of presidential removal power in
the Debate of 1789. Moreover, he concluded that only "a mere
fraction of a fraction, a minority of a minority" of the House be-
lieved that there was any inherent removal power in the execu-
tive. 55 Other analysts have concluded that the First Congress
clearly did not decide that the executive possessed any inherent
removal power. Even those participants who favored the language
which appeared to grant to the President an unfettered hand in
removal did so only because the Secretary of Foreign Affairs was to
be a political officer who would be an ally and agent of the Presi-
dent. 56 The most serious criticism of Chief Justice Taft's history
was Justice Brandeis' writing in dissent to the majority position in
151. Id. at 1061, 1078 (citations omitted).
152. Supra notes 119-142.
153. See supra notes 80-91 and accompaning text.
154. See supra note 144 and accompaning text.
155. Corwin, supra note 65, at 362.
156. Donovan and Irvine, The President's Power to Remove Members of Ad-
minsitrative Agencies, 21 CORNELL L. Q. 215, 218-219 (1936).
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Myers. After maintaining that the issue in "the Great Debate"
over the Decision of 1789 was not whether the President had "un-
controllable" power,6 7 Justice Brandeis then addressed the House
and Senate positions in the debate. In the Senate the vote was
even. However, in the House, he observed that only twenty-four of
fifty-four members participated in the debate. Of the twenty-four
who participated, "only six appear to have held the opinion that
the President possessed the uncontrollable power of removal." '58
The balance of the twenty-four were divided into a veritable
hodge-podge of differing positions.159 As he observed, the vote in
the Decision of 1789 was aided by those representatives who be-
lieved that it was "expedient" for Congress to confer the power to
remove on the President acting alone.6 0 This meant, of course,
that it was emphatically not the understanding of the majority, or
even of a large number of representatives who participated in the
debate and Decision of 1789, that the President possessed inherent
removal power.
E. Humphrey's Executor v. United States
Much of this changed in 1935, when the Supreme Court de-
cided the case of Humphrey's Executor v. United States.'
Humphrey was a commissioner of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion'62 who had been appointed for a term of seven years by Presi-
dent Hoover. During Humphrey's term of office as a commissioner,
President Roosevelt sent a demand for his resignation. This de-
mand was repeated in a subsequent communication in which the
President stated that:
You will, I know, realize that I do not feel that your mind and my
157. Myers, 272 U.S. at 284 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
158. Id.
159. Justice Brandeis noted that in addition to the six who held the position
that the President had an inherent, unlimited power of removal, Madison himself
at first conceded that the President shared the power with the Congress; seven
representatives held the position that removal was subject to congressional action;
five held the position that the power of removal was shared by the President and
the Senate; two held that impeachment was the sole method of removal; three
representatives made "desultory" remarks which could not be classified one way
of the other; and one representative, Ames, "was only certain that the Senate
should not participate in removals ... ." Id. at 285 n. 73.
160. Id. at 285-86, nn. 74, 75.
161. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
162. Hereinafter FTC.
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mind go along together on either the policies or the administering
of the Federal Trade Commission, and, frankly, I think it is best
for the people of this country that I should have a full
confidence. '
After Humphrey refused to resign, President Roosevelt wrote a let-
ter to him which stated that he was "removed" from the office of
commissioner of the FTC.""
The Supreme Court recognized two issues in the case. First,
whether provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act which
provide that the President can remove a commissioner for enumer-
ated causes limits the power of the President to remove only for
those enumerated causes;165 and, second, whether the Congress has
the power under the Constitution to limit the power of the Presi-
dent to remove Federal Trade Commissioners. 66
On the first issue, the Court held that the intent of Congress
was to limit the President to the enumerated causes for removal.
In resolving this issue, the Court carefully analyzed the powers
that Congress had delegated to the FTC. The Court found that the
FTC, under its power to police unfair methods in interstate com-
merce, had been given the power to issue complaints, investigate,
prosecute, and in some cases hold hearings."6 7 The Supreme Court
carefully examined the purposes of Congress in creating the FTC.
It found those purposes to be the creation of a "non-partisan"
commission, whose duties are "neither political nor executive, but
predominantly quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative. '"1 8 To exercise
those quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative powers, the objective of
Congress was to create a body of experts who would act with com-
plete impartiality (as distinguished by the Court from ones who
would act politically)." 9 The Supreme Court reasoned that the
only way that this expertise could be developed was appointments
for a fixed term of years, the method chosen by Congress." ' The
163. Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 619.
164. Id.
165. The resolution of this issue concerns statutory interpretation, and not
the constitutional issue of whether the President or Congress or the both of them
have removal power; however, the Supreme Court analysis of the FTC statute
sheds considerable light on its approach to the second constitutional issue.
166. Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 619.
167. Id. at 620-21.
168. Id. at 624.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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Court concluded that recognizing an unrestricted power of removal
in the President would thwart that objective. 7'
On the second issue of the constitutionality of limiting re-
moval to enumerated causes in the Federal Trade Commission Act,
the Supreme Court took considerable pains to distinguish the My-
ers opinion."7 2 The Court based its distinction in part on the na-
ture or character of the office concerned. The Court reasoned that
Myers involved a postmaster, "an executive officer restricted to the
performance of executive functions. 173 The Supreme Court rea-
soned that the FTC, on the other hand, was "created by Congress
to carry into effect legislative policies embodied in the statute in
accordance with the legislative standard therein prescribed, and to
171. Thus, the language of the act, the legislative reports, and the gen-
eral purposes of the legislation as reflected by the debates, all combine to
demonstrate the Congressional intent to create a body of experts who
shall gain experience by length of service-a body which shall be inde-
pendent of executive authority, except in its selection, and free to exer-
cise its judgment without the leave or hindrance of any other official or
any department of the government. To the accomplishment of these pur-
poses, it is clear that Congress was of opinion that length and certainty
of tenure would vitally contribute. And to hold that, nevertheless, the
members of the commission continue in office at the mere will of the
President, might be to thwart, in large measure, the very ends which
Congress sought to realize by definitely fixing the term of office.
Id. at 625,626. (emphasis in original).
172. ". . . [Tihe narrow point actually decided [in the Myers decision] was
only that the President had power to remove a postmaster of the first class, with-
out the advice and consent of the Senate as required by act of Congress." Id. at
626.
In explaining the limitation under the principle of stare decisis, Justice Suth-
erland drew upon Cohens v. Virginia as authority:
It is a maxim, not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every
opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those ex-
pressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected,
but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit, when the
very point is presented for decision.
Id. at 627 (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399 (1821)).
173. Id.
He is charged with no duty at all related to either the legislative or judi-
cial power. The actual decision in the Myers case finds support in the
theory that such an officer is merely one of the units in the executive
department and, hence, inherently subject to the exclusive and illimita-
ble power of removal by the Chief Executive, whose subordinate and aid
he is .... [T]he necessary reach of the [Myers] decision goes far enough
to include all purely executive officers. It goes no farther ....
Id. at 626-627.
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perform other specified duties as a legislative or as a judicial
aid.' 74 This purpose meant that its duties were not performed at
executive discretion, and had to be free from executive control. 7 5
After expressly distinguishing and limiting the Myers deci-
sion, 1 76 the Court directly addressed the issue of the power of the
President under the Constitution to remove officers and the power
of Congress to create officers who would act independently of the
executive and who could be removed by the executive during their
terms only for cause as defined by the Congress. 7 7 The principal
rationale was separation of powers theory. 7 8 Justice Sutherland
explained that separation of powers in removal cases consists of
174. Id. at 628.
175. The Court concluded that "[t]o the extent that it [the FTC] exercises
any executive function-as distinguished from executive power in the constitu-
tional sense-it does so in the discharge and effectuation of its quasi-legislative or
quasi-judicial powers, or as an agency of the legislative or judicial departments of
the government." Id.
176. .. In the course of the opinion of the Court [in Myers], expressions
occur which tend to sustain the government's contention, but these are
beyond the point involved and, therefore, do not come within the rule of
stare decisis. In so far as they are out of harmony with the views here set
forth, these expressions are disapproved.
Id. at 626.
177. Relying upon the Myers decision, the Solicitor General argued squarely
that the Executive has an inherent power of removal with which the Congress
cannot interfere:
If the Court should be of the opinion that §1 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act deprives the President of the power to remove a Commis-
sioner except for one or more of the causes stated, we submit that the
provision is unconstitutional.
A statute limiting the President's removal power to removal for cer-
tain causes is as unwarranted an interference with the executive power as
is a statute requiring participation by the Senate in a removal ....
If Congress can provide that the President may remove only for inef-
ficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office, it presumably could
provide that he might remove only for malfeasance in office or only for
neglect of duty. The result would be that the President would have no
power, even with the aid of the Senate, to remove an admittedly ineffi-
cient officer in the executive branch of the Government.
Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 616 (argument for the United States).
178. The fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the three general de-
partments of government entirely free from the control or coercive influence, di-
rect or indirect, of either of the others, has often been stressed and is hardly open
to serious question. So much is implied in the very fact of the separation of pow-
ers of these departments by the Constitution; and in the rule which recognizes
their essential co-equality. Id. at 629-30.
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the principle "that makes one master in his own house" and that
this "precludes him from imposing his control in the house of an-
other who is master there.' 7 Applied in Humphrey's Executor,
this meant that the "master-in-your-own-house" idea would be vi-
olated if the executive's assertion of unrestricted power to remove
were recognized, for it would exercise a coercive influence which
would threaten to impair the impartial and independent function-
ing of an agency which discharged legislative and judicial duties.1 80
As part of its discussion of separation of powers issues, the
Supreme Court in Humphrey's Executor analyzed the Decision of
1789. The analysis was partially under the guise of testing the va-
lidity of the history cited in the Myers' opinion.181  The
Humphrey's Executor opinion simply concludes that a reading of
the "Great Debate" clearly indicates that substantial presidential
removal power was only contemplated in connection with executive
officers.182 The Humphrey's Executor Court observed that even
Madison, the representative who introduced the original motion
which appears to recognize an inherent executive power to remove
in the First Congress, appeared to believe that this expansive
power applied only to purely executive officers. 183 The ultimate
holding in the Humphrey's Executor decision was that the Presi-
dent's power of removal, as opposed to congressional removal for
cause, depends on the "character of the office." The Myers' hold-
ing was confined to "purely" executive officers and no removal
could be made of FTC commissioners or other like officers except
for statutorily defined cause.184 The Humphrey's Executor opinion
recognized that it had not disposed of all ambiguity, for doubt
would exist in the future as to which offices were purely executive
and which were partially legislative or judicial. 8 '
A major criticism of Myers made in the Humphrey's Executor
decision was that the framers' intent had not been, as Myers as-
serted, to give the executive an extensive power of removal.1 8 It is
here that Justice Sutherland made the most serious criticism of
179. Id. at 630.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 631.
182. Id. at 630-31.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 631-32.
185. Id. at 632.
186. Id. at 629.
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the Myers opinion's treatment of the history of removal8 7 Justice
Sutherland, referring to the "Great Debate," noted that James
Madison and others had thought that any inherent removal power
that the President might have was limited to purely executive of-
ficers.188 The Humprey opinion includes later argument by James
Madison that the Comptroller of the Treasury was not purely
executive but judicial as well. Therefore, he could not be removed
by the President acting alone.189 Madison's argument makes it
quite clear that he understood that only officers performing wholly
executive duties could be removed by the President. He argued:
It will be necessary . . to consider the nature of this office, to
enable us to come to a right decision on the subject; in analyzing
its properties, we shall easily discover they are not purely of an
executive nature. It seems to me that they partake of a Judiciary
quality as well as Executive; perhaps the latter obtains in the
greatest degree .... This partakes strongly of the judicial charac-
ter, and there may be strong reasons why an officer of this kind
should not hold his office at the pleasure of the Executive branch
of the Government.1 90
This debate occurred one week after the "Great Debate of 1789,"
which makes it difficult to see how Madison could have believed as
Chief Justice Taft, in Myers, had insisted he believed. 191 Moreover,
Justice Sutherland, writing in Humphrey's Executor, was correct
in stating that many of the participants in the "Great Debate"
voted for the bill only because it was clear that the office being
created was to be a tool of the President.9 2 For example, one rep-
resentative argued that "[t]he argument of convenience is strong in
favor of the President; for this man is an arm or an eye to him: he
sees and writes his secret despatches, he is an instrument over
which the President ought to have complete command ... 
Another representative argued:
If, then, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs is the mere instrument
of the President, one would suppose, on the principle of expedi-
ency, this officer should be dependent upon him. It would seem
187. Id. at 630-31.
188. Id. at 631.
189. Id.
190. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, col. 611-12.
191. See supra, notes 137-140 and accompanying text.
192. Corwin, supra note 65, at 362.
193. Id. at 365 (citing 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, col. 531-32).
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incongruous and absurd, that an officer who, in the reason and
nature of things, is dependent on his principal, and appointed
merely to execute such business as is committed to the charge of
his superior, (for this business, I contend, is committed solely to
his charge); I say it would be absurd, in the highest degree, to
continue such a person in office contrary to the will of the Presi-
dent .... 194
There are numerous other statements of representatives in the
"Great Debate" which disclose that the position which the Su-
preme Court took in the Humphrey's Executor opinion was the
historically correct one regarding the framers' intent. The intent of
the framers who participated in the "Great Debate" was that the
President have the plenary power to remove only officers with to-
tally executive duties or ones who were to be members of the exec-
utive branch who assist the President (a concept very close to an
inferior officer under the Appointments Clause). '95 Thus, it was
clear that the historical inquiry into the framers' intent in the
Humphrey's Executor decision was more accurate, and therefore
more persuasive, than the sweepingly asserted positions in the My-
ers decision. Although persuasive, the Humphrey's Executor deci-
sion disclaimed an intent to settle all issues of presidential removal
power and purposely left open many questions to be settled in the
future.196
194. Id. (citing 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, col. 542).
195. For example, when the First Congress took up the subject of creating
the Foreign Affairs office, on Tuesday, May 19, 1789, they made it clear that they
were all, from the beginning of the debate and throughout, concerned with execu-
tive departments, that is, departments which were part of the Executive branch.
The subject was introduced by Representative Boudinot:
MR. BOUDINOT: I rise Mr. Chairman . . . to introduce a subject to the
consideration of the Committee .... The great Executive departments
which were in existence under the late Confederation, are now at an end,
at least so far as not to be able to conduct the business of the United
States. If we take up the present Constitution, we shall find it contem-
plates departments of an Executive nature in and of the President: it
then remains for us to carry this intention into effect. ...
MR. BENSON: wished the Committee to consider what he judged to be a
previous question, namely how many departments there should be estab-
lished? He . . . would ... move that there be established in aid of the
Chief Magistrate [the President], three Executive departments ....
1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, cols. 368-370. (emphasis added).
196. To the extent that, between the decision in the Myers case, which
sustains the unrestrictable power of the President to remove purely exec-
utive officers, and our present decision that such power does not extend
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F. Wiener v. United States
The next Supreme Court case which dealt with the removal
power of the executive was Wiener v. United States.'97 In the Wie-
ner case, Congress created the War Claims Board to "receive and
adjudicate according to law,"'198 claims for compensation for intern-
ees, prisoners of war, and religious organizations who suffered per-
sonal injury or property damage inflicted by the enemy during
World War II.' The Commission consisted of three members, two
of whom had to be lawyers.200 The statute by which Congress cre-
ated the War Claims Board provided that the commissioners were
to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of
the Senate. 0' The statute also provided that the Commission
would wind up its affairs three years after the statute of limita-
tions for filing claims.2 2 The statute contained no other definition
of the terms of the commissioners and there were no provisions for
removal by the President or otherwise. 0 3
Wiener was nominated by President Truman and confirmed in
1950. In 1953, President Eisenhower requested his resignation, but
Commissioner Wiener refused. President Eisenhower then re-
moved Wiener.2 4 Wiener subsequently sought back pay from the
time of his removal until the War Claims Board was dissolved.
to an office such as that here involved, there shall remain a field of
doubt, we leave such cases as may fall within it for future consideration
and determination as they arise.
Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 632. The Humphrey's Executor decision was
not without its detractors and critics after it was decided, and has been criticized
since. See Bruff, On the Constitutional Status of Administrative Agencies, 36
AM. U. L. REV. 491, 498 (1987) (Humphreys "filled with broad theory" and "broad
dicta."); Verkuil, The Status of Independent Agencies, 1986 DUKE L. J. 779, 784
(1986) (distinction based on label "quasi" unsatisfactory); Strauss, The Place of
Agencies in Government, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 612 (1984) (Humphreys places
FTC in judicial and legislative branch, but doesn't explain how agency can reside
in two branches at once); Nathanson, Separation of Powers and Administrative
Law, 27 Nw. U. L. REV. 1064, 1101 (1981) ("unworkable").
197. 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
198. Id. at 350.
199. Id.
200. 50 U.S.C.A. § 2001 (1948).
201. Id.
202. 50 U.S.C.A. § 2001(e) (1948).
203. Id.
204. Weiner, 357 U.S. at 350 (the President stated in removing Wiener: "I
regard it as in the national interest to complete the administration of the War
Claims Act of 1948, as amended, with personnel of my own selection").
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The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Frank-
furter, held that Wiener had been unconstitutionally removed by
the President. ' " The opinion recognized the Myers and
Humphrey's Executor opinions as the leading Supreme Court pro-
nouncements on the subject of presidential removal. The Court
noted that the Humphrey's Executor decision, which had drasti-
cally limited the scope of the Myers precedent, was now the con-
trolling precedent.20 6 The Court also noted that in the present
case, Congress had said nothing about removal. In such case, under
the Humphrey's Executor principal holding, with respect to an of-
ficer who was not purely executive2 7 and who was to exercise his
judgment without permission or interference of any other officer of
government, 208 the power of removal by the President exists only if
Congress has conferred it. 20 9 The Wiener opinion interpreted the
rationale of Humphrey's Executor for this distinction between the
absolute executive power of removal in case of purely executive of-
ficers on the one hand and those whose job requires freedom from
executive interference on the principle that one who "holds his of-
fice only during the pleasure of another '2 10 will not be able to exer-
cise independent judgment. Thus in Wiener, the Supreme Court
interpreted Myers and Humphrey's Executor together to stand for
the following ideas: first, from Myers, the President has inherent
removal powers over purely executive officers; second, with officers
who perform duties which are to involve independent judgment, it
is entirely within the power of Congress to define the terms of re-
moval of such officers; and third, in such case the President has
only such power as the Congress has conferred upon him.
In the Wiener case, Justice Frankfurter reasoned that these
principles required the Court to search for the intent of Congress
regarding removal.2 ' The way to discover that intent in spite of
the Congressional lack of explicitness was, according to Justice
Frankfurter, to examine the "nature of the function[s]" and the
205. Id at 356.
206. Id. at 352.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 353.
209. Id.
210. Id. (quoting Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 625-26).
211. ". .. And can the inference fairly be drawn from the failure of Congress
to provide for removal that these Commissioners were to remain in office at the
will of the President? For such is the assertion of power on which petitioner's
removal must rest." Id. at 353-54.
216 [Vol. 11:175
42
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1989], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol11/iss2/3
EXECUTIVE REMOVAL POWER
duties which Congress delegated to the War Claims Board.212 After
reviewing the history of the legislation which created the War
Claims Board, the Court had no difficulty concluding that the
Board was created as an adjudicatory body which was to decide
cases on the merits and according to law. 13 This meant that Con-
gress intended the Board to be free from control or coercive influ-
ence.2" 4 It must be inferred that Congress did not wish the "Damo-
cles sword of removal by the President" to hang over the Board
because the executive wished to have his own men on that body.2 '15
Wiener did not engage in any historical analysis, but merely
interpreted and applied the Humphrey's Executor decision as a
precedent. Nevertheless, the Wiener interpretation carried the
Humphrey's Executor holding several steps further and added sev-
eral refinements to the holding of that case. First, in Wiener, the
President's removal power with regard to officers who were not
purely executive was held to be strictly restricted, even though
Congress had said nothing at all about removal, whether for cause
or otherwise. This was arguably an extension of Humphrey's Exec-
utor in that Congress had made some provision for removal for
cause there, but had said absolutely nothing about removal for
cause or otherwise in Wiener. Second, the Supreme Court in the
Wiener decision made the nature of the function or duty which the
agency was to perform serve as a principal indicator of congres-
sional intent on the subject of removal. This position assumes that
these duties and functions can be consistently described or charac-
terized in order to determine congressional intent. Needless to say,
this approach vests very substantial power of interpretation or
power to announce congressional intent in the Supreme Court.
G. Bowsher v. Synar and Morrison v. Olson
More recently, the Supreme Court decided two cases which
deal with the removal power. These cases were Bowsher v.
Synar,"' and Morrison v. Olson.21 In Bowsher, Congress passed
the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of
212. Id. at 353.
213. Id. at 354-55.
214. Id. at 355.
215. Id. at 356.
216. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
217. 108 S.Ct. 2597 (1988).
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1985,218 also known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act. Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings was an attempt by Congress to reduce the fed-
eral deficit. Generally, the Act attempted to gradually reduce the
federal deficit by establishing a procedure for several officers to fol-
low each year over a five year period.219 This procedure would re-
duce federal expenditures until the deficit had been reduced. The
Act provided that the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) and the Director of the Congressional Budget Of-
fice (CBO) would estimate the deficit for a current year, then de-
cide how much it would be necessary to cut from the budget in
that year.220 OMB and CBO would transmit their estimate to the
Comptroller General, who would review it, and decide how to reach
the statutorily mandated reduction in the deficit for that year.221
The Comptroller General would then transmit a report to the
President, who was obligated to issue sequestration orders to re-
duce spending on various programs.
The Act was attacked on separation of powers principles. 2
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia held
that the Act was not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power, but that it was unconstitutional because it assigned an ex-
ecutive function to an officer, the Comptroller General, who was
removable by Congress. Since the Congressional removal power
meant that the legislature had "here and now subservience" '223 over
an executive officer, the district court reasoned that the principle
of separation of powers had been violated."
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision in a majority opin-
ion written by Chief Justice Burger.2 25 Generally, the Chief Justice
reasoned that the principles of separation of powers and checks
and balances mean that each branch must be independent of the
218. Pub. L. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1038, 2 U.S.C.A. § 901 et seq. This statute will
hereinafter be referred to as the Act or Gramm-Rudman-Hollings.
219. 2 U.S.C.A. § 901.
220. 2 U.S.C.A. § 901(a)(2).
221. 2 U.S.C.A. § 903.
222. The action attacking the statute was brought by a U.S. Representative,
Michael Synar, and several other representatives on the basis that an unconstitu-
tional delegation had occurred, and co-plaintiffs were the members of a federal
union.
223. Synar v. United States, 626 F.Supp. 1374, 1392 (1986).
224. A direct appeal was taken to the Supreme Court under a statutory pro-
vision for such appeal contained in section 275 of the Act.
225. Justices Brennan, Powell, Rehnquist and O'Conner joined in the major-
ity opinion.
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others. Therefore, the power of removal cannot be exercised by one
branch over officers of another branch.2 " The majority then rea-
soned and concluded: first, that the Comptroller General performs
executive functions under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings; 227 second,
that he is removable by the legislature under provisions of the stat-
ute which created the office of Comptroller General;228 and there-
fore, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings is unconstitutional because the re-
moval power over the Comptroller General, exercisable by the
legislature makes him, an executive officer, subservient to another
branch, the legislature. 229 The process of reasoning and analysis in
reaching these conclusions was as follows. First, the majority rea-
soned that because the statute which creates the post of Comptrol-
ler General provides for removal for five different enumerated
causes, the Comptroller General can be removed by impeachment
or by joint resolution of both houses of Congress.230 Arguments to
the contrary nothwithstanding, the Chief Justice then turned to
the legislative record and found evidence that the intent of the re-
moval for cause provision was to bring the Comptroller General
under the control of Congress.2 31' He argued that not only was this
the intent of Congress, but also that the effect of removal provi-
sions of such breadth was to make the Comptroller General sub-
servient to Congress. Moreover, in response to an argument in Jus-
tice White's dissent that a realistic look at these removal
provisions indicates that the Comptroller General is "unlikely" to
be removed by Congress.2 32 The Chief Justice's response illustrated
226. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 722.
227. Id. at 732-33.
228. Id. at 728.
229. Id. at 727.
230. Id.
231 .... This [for cause removal] provision was included, as one Con-
gressman explained in urging passage of the Act, because Congress "felt
that (the Comptroller General) would be brought under the sole control
of Congress, so that Congress at the moment when it found he was ineffi-
cient and was not carrying on the duties of his office as he should and as
the Congress expected, could remove him without the long, tedious pro-
cess of a trial by impeachment ....
... Representative Hawley commented: "[H]e is our officer, in a mea-
sure, getting information for us .... If he does not do his work properly,
we, as practically his employers, ought to be able to discharge him from
office."
Id. at 728.
232. Id. at 730.
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his different approach to the problem of removal and of interpreta-
tion of the Constitution. The Chief Justice stated "[t]he framers
recognized that, in the long term, structural protections against
abuse of power were critical to preserving liberty. In constitutional
terms, the removal powers over the Comptroller General's office
dictate that he will be subservient to Congress."' 33 The second step
in the majority analysis was examination of the Comptroller Gen-
eral's duties to determine whether they were legislative or execu-
tive. Chief Justice Burger concluded that the Comptroller General
performed executive duties because he would prepare a report
which was to implement and apply the Act. 34 Thus, the net effect
of the majority's arguments led to the conclusion that the legisla-
tive branch was exerting control through the removal power over
an officer performing executive duties.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall, concurred. Justice
Stevens disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the existence
of a removal power by the Congress created here and now subservi-
ence. He concluded that this was not a sufficient reason for af-
firming the district court. Instead, he argued that the Comptroller
General is a member of the legislative branch. 3 5 His duties require
him to make policy decisions which have the force of law, a feature
which is quintessentially legislative in nature. However, to Justice
Stevens, policymaking of this type is a duty which falls within the
proscription of INS v. Chadha,23 which held that if the Congress
is legislating, it must follow the requirements of Article I of the
Constitution for presidential presentment and bicameral
passage. 3 7
Justice White dissented. He critized the majority's approach
as "distressingly formalistic.21 38 He argued that the majority opin-
233. Id.
234. . . .[W]e view these functions as plainly entailing execution of the
law in constitutional terms. Interpreting a law enacted by Congress to
implement the legislative mandate is the very essence of "execution of
the law." Under section 252 [of the Act], the Comptroller General must
exercise judgment concerning facts that affect the application of the Act.
He must also interpret the provisions of the Act to determine precisely
what budgetary calculations are required. Decisions of that kind are typi-
cally made by officers charged with executing a statute.
Id. at 732-33.
235. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
236. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
237. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 754.
238. Id. at 759.
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ion was incorrect: first, in focusing upon a feature of the legislative
scheme which is of minimal significance and secondly, in conclud-
ing that a statutory scheme which does not pose a substantial
threat to fundamental separation of powers themes is unconstitu-
tional.2 39 The first part of his argument was that the limitation on
removal by the President, which Congress imposed in the Act, was
not a violation of separation of powers because it does not prevent
the executive branch from performing its constitutionally assigned
functions.2 10 He also reasoned that, "[o]nly where the potential for
disruption [of the executive branch]"' 24' is present, do separation
concerns become paramount. In making the inquiry into whether
that disruption has occurred and whether it is justified by a need
to promote objectives within the constitutional power of Congress,
"formalistic and unbending " rules should not be followed.242 In
the case before the Court, Justice White argued that determining
levels of federal spending is not a function central to the presi-
dency and appropriations matters are peculiarly within the power
of Congress. 43 Moreover, Congress created a precise set of criteria
for the Comptroller General to follow in the Act in order to mini-
mize the policy of setting power and duties of that officer.244 Thus,
the core functions of the executive branch were not interfered with
by Gramm-Rudman-Hollings.
In addition, Justice White rejected any argument based upon
the Chadha decision which was relied upon by the majority. In the
first place, he argued that the removal power which was described
by the majority as having considerable "breadth,"'2"5 is in fact quite
narrow. This is so, he argued, because removal can occur only for
violation of one of five precisely drawn reasons, and because re-
moval requires a majority of both houses and a failure of the Presi-
dent to veto. ' " Therefore, as a practical matter, it would be nearly
impossible for Congress to remove the Comptroller General. Jus-
tice White argued that certainly such difficult-to-satisfy removal
provisions prevented any subservience by the Comptroller General
239. Id.
240. Id. at 762.
241. Id. at 763.
242. Id. at 763.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 764.
245. Id. at 729.
246. Id. at 767.
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to the Congress.2 7 Moreover, he persuasively argued that the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings' provisions for removal satisfy the bi-
cameral passage and presidental presentment provisions which the
Supreme Court insisted upon in the Chadha opinion for any type
of legislative action.2 48 The most vigorously argued portion of Jus-
tice White's dissent was his position that the true question in the
case was whether there was a real threat of "encroachment or ag-
grandizement" by the legislature.2 49 The "for cause" provisions for
removal and the President's role in removal make it impossible for
Congress to be encroaching or aggrandizing.250 He argued that the
practical result of these substantive and procedural provisions is to
make the Comptroller General one of the most independent of-
ficers in government and he concluded that thus, there is abso-
lutely no threat to separation of powers principles.251
One of the most interesting portions of the Bowsher opinion is
the majority's view of separation of powers. This view was built on
examination of the intent of the framers of the Constitution, upon
the Decision of 1789, and upon the precedents of Myers v. United
States,252 Humphrey's Executor v. United States,253 and Wiener v.
United States.2 54 Beginning with a general recognition that the
framers of the Constitution adopted separation of powers in order
to diffuse power and secure individual liberty,255 the Court also
recognized that checks and balances were an integral part of sepa-
ration theory. 5 6 This meant, according to the Chief Justice, that
the framers provided for "a vigorous legislative branch and a sepa-
247. Id.
248. Id. at 767-68.
249. Id. at 770.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 733.
252. See supra notes 119-142 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 155-189 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 190-199 and accompanying text.
255. .. . The declared purpose of separating and dividing the powers of
government, of course, was 'to diffus[e] power the better to secure lib-
erty.' Justice Jackson's words [in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Saw-
yer, 343 U.S. 579 (1953)] echo the famous warning of Montesquieu,
quoted by James Madison in THE FEDERALIST No. 47, that 'there can be
no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in the
same person, or body of magistrates'....
Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 721 (citations omitted).
256. Id. at 722.
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rate and wholly independent executive branch.25 According to the
Chief Justice, this means that in the removal area, the Constitu-
tion does not "contemplate" an active role for Congress in super-
vising officers who execute laws.25 Once an appointment has been
made on the nomination of the executive with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate under Article II, section 2, Congress can remove
the appointee only by impeachment.2 59 The Chief Justice con-
cluded that any direct congressional role in removal of officers in-
volved in execution beyond impeachment is inconsistent with prin-
ciples of separation of powers.2"'
The Chief Justice found justification for these conclusions in
the Decision of 1789, and the Myers, Humphrey's Executor and
Wiener decisions. There, Justice Burger argued, Madison's posi-
tion, that the Congress could have no role in removal of executive
officers except by impeachment, had prevailed."' The Chief Jus-
tice then analyzed briefly the Myers, Humphrey's Executor, and
Wiener decisions. 6 2 Surprisingly (to this writer) he concluded that
those decisions were perfectly consistent. He distinguished
Humphrey's Executor from Myers on the basis that a different is-
sue emerged in Humphrey's Executor: whether Congress could
limit the president's power of removal of a Federal Trade Commis-
sioner. He also noted that the Humphrey's Executor decision itself
reaffirmed its holding that Congressional participation in the re-
moval of executive officers is unconstitutional" on the basis of
"crucial" separation of powers considerations.26 3 The Chief Justice
observed that the Wiener decision simply followed Humphrey's
Executor and concluded that "in light of these precedents," Con-
gress cannot remove an officer charged with executive duties ex-
cept by impeachment. 6 4
Those parts of the majority opinion in Bowsher which relate
to the intent of the framers, the Decision of 1789, and the Myers,
Humphrey's Executor and Wiener decisions are inaccurate or con-
257. Id.
258. Id. at 722.
259. Id. at 723.
260. Id.
261. Id. (The Chief Justice also argued that the Decision of 1789 was
"weighty evidence" of the Constitution's meaning because so many of the mem-
bers of the First Congress were framers of the Constitution).
262. Id. at 725.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 725-726.
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fused. There can be no doubt that the majority's understanding of
the history of separation of powers and of the removal power of the
executive and legislature, as expressed by the Chief Justice, were
powerful determinants of the outcome. That understanding was
based in large part on a version of separation of powers and re-
moval which is questionable, and which, as a result, seriously un-
dermines the authoritativeness of the majority opinion. Direct
comparison with the majority position illustrates numerous
problems.
In the first place, the major source relied upon by Chief Jus-
tice Burger for his version of the framers' intent and the meaning
of the Decision of 1789 was the Myers opinion.6 5 It has already
been pointed out how seriously the historical inaccuracies in the
Myers opinion undermine the authority of that case as a prece-
dent.26 6 There is considerable agreement that the Decision of 1789
did not represent the understanding of more than a few of the
signers of the Constitution that the executive had inherent re-
moval power. In fact, the majority,67 who voted for that decision,
did so not because they believed that the executive had inherent
general removal power, but because of wholly different opinions
about the removal power.2 6 The Chief Justice's position that the
meaning of James Madison's arguments in the "Great Debate" was
that the executive possessed extensive inherent removal power is
probably inaccurate. It has been pointed out above, in connection
with the Humphrey's Executor opinion, that one week after the
"Great Debate," Madison clearly and unequivocally stated that the
executive should have removal power only over officers who are
members of the executive branch.6 9
The Chief Justice's analysis of the Humphrey's Executor pre-
cedent was also inaccurate. His reconciliation of the Humphrey's
Executor decision with the Myers decision stated that those cases
had virtually the same holdings on the subject of separation of
powers and removal. 70 However, the Humphrey's Executor deci-
265. Id. at 723. (for example, the citation which the Chief Justice offers in
Bowsher for his explanation of the Decision of 1789 is the Myers case).
266. See supra notes 145-160 and accompanying text.
267. Myers, 272 U.S. at 284-85. (Brandeis, J. dissenting) (eighteen represent-
atives of twenty-four who participated in the "Great Debate" did not hold the
position that the executive had unlimited removal power).
268. See supra notes 157-160.
269. See supra notes 189-191 and accompanying text.
270. The Chief Justice rested primarily upon a very general statement of sep-
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sion did not hold as the Chief Justice claimed.71 Instead, the deci-
sion in Humphrey's Executor drew a clear distinction between of-
ficers whose duties were wholly or purely executive, such as a
postmaster, and other types of officers who did not have wholly
executive duties but who were required to perform legislative and
judicial duties, such as members of the Federal Trade Commission,
in which they were required to exercise independent judgement in
applying a statute. '72 The statements which the Chief Justice
wrote in the majority opinion about the Humphrey's Executor and
Myers decisions resting on identical separation of power principles
is accurate at a level of generality which is nearly useless, that is
both opinions recognize separation of powers, since that concept is
undeniably part and parcel of the Constitution. On the other hand,
the version of separation of powers which each of those opinions
follows to reach their holdings are wholly dissimilar. Myers reasons
that separation of power in connection with the Appointments
Clause and removal means that the executive has almost unlimited
inherent removal power because of implications from the doctrine
of separation of powers. Humphrey's Executor reasons that when-
ever Congress has created an officer who has executive, quasi-judi-
cial and quasi-legislative duties which require independent judge-
ment, then the executive cannot remove him except for causes
specified in the statute creating the office. This position is also pre-
mised in large part on the Humphrey's Executor majority's under-
standing of the doctrine of separation of powers. The Chief Jus-
tice's reconciliation in the Bowsher opinion of the case of Wiener
v. United States27" with the Myers and Humphrey's Executor
opinions was equally unpersuasive, for in the same fashion he sim-
ply stated that the Wiener opinion reaffirmed basic separation of
powers principles just as Myers and Humphrey's Executor had
aration of principles in Humphrey's Executor:
The fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the three general de-
partments of government entirely free from the control or coercive influ-
ence, direct or indirect, of either of the others, has often been stressed
and is hardly open to serious question. So much is implied in the very
fact of the separation of the powers of these departments by the Consti-
tution; and in the rule which recognizes their essential co-equality.
Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 725 (quoting 295 U.S. at 629-30).
271. See supra notes 161-196 and accompanying text.
272. Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 628.
273. 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
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done.2 74 The Wiener decision did far more than that. In the first
place, Wiener expressly accepted the position of the Supreme
Court in Humphrey's Executor, and not of Myers, on the subject
of separation of power and removal.2 75  Based upon the
Humphrey's Executor decision, Wiener held that, "if an officer is
not purely executive and is to exercise independent judgement,
then, not only does the President not have the inherent general
power to remove him, but the President only has such power if
the Congress gives it to him. '2 76 To state it another way,
Humphrey's Executor and Wiener interpret the executive removal
power in the context of separation of power principles to mean
that, with officers who exercise executive functions but who also
exercise judicial and legislative functions, the Constitution does
not confer inherent, much less extensive, removal power on the ex-
ecutive. Moreover, Congress defines the power which the executive
does possess by statute, for the President can remove such officers
only for the causes specified in the statute creating the office, and
only if the statute provides for removal for cause by the executive.
The statements in Bowsher which suggest that the Myers,
Humphrey's Executor and Wiener decisions are consistent in their
understanding of separation of powers and the history of that doc-
trine are thus confusing at best, and misleading at worst. The short
of it is that the opinion of the majority in Bowsher contradicts the
holdings of Humphrey's Executor and Wiener. It also expresses a
different version of the intent of the framers on the genesis, his-
tory, and interpretation of the appointment and removal powers
and the concept of separation of powers.
The historical understanding of the Bowsher majority is also
flawed in another, equally serious, but less obvious way. The Chief
Justice assumes in the Bowsher majority opinion that there are
clear, bright lines which separate the three branches of government
and that there is a structural purity of function intended to be
part of the Constitution which was drafted into it by the framers.
This "bright line" concept of separation of powers assumes or im-
plies that it is easy to separate executive, judicial, and legislative
function, and that each branch performs only "pure" functions ap-
propriate for that branch. Under this concept, the executive
branch performs only totally executive function, the legislative
274. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 725-26.
275. See supra notes 197-215, and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 207-209 and accompanying text.
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branch performs only wholly legislative function, and the judicial
branch performs only utterly judicial functions."' The flaw in this
line of reasoning is that this interpretation of separation of powers
did not exist at the time the Constitution was drafted, nor at the
time of the Decision of 1789. For example, a major objection to the
concept of separation of powers was that, as drafted into the pro-
posed Constitution, it did not maintain clear separation of powers,
but permitted what was then known as "blending."27 James
Madison's defense of the Constitution in the Federalist papers vig-
orously defended the concept of blending and there can be no
doubt that the understanding of Madison himself (and this is the
same James Madison who was cited by the majority in Bowsher for
the proposition that absolute separation must be maintained '9 )
was that there was no absolute, purely structural separation of
powers in the Constitution."' In fact, it was the very concept of
blending of powers which was the cornerstone of Madison's con-
cept of checks and balances.28' To imply or assume that Madison
was a believer in absolute, bright line separation of powers is sim-
ply to ignore the historical record and the writings of Madison on
the topic of separation of powers. Thus, the majority opinion in
the Bowsher case rests upon dubious history and precedents. It
misunderstands and misdescribes the debates over separation of
powers and appointment and removal at the Constitutional Con-
vention. It also misinterprets the meaning of the Decision of 1789
and propagates those errors in its interpretation of the principal
precedents on the subject of the executive removal power.
The most recent case on the removal power, Morrison v. Ol-
son,182 is a considerable change from the approach of the Bowsher
majority on the subject of the removal power and separation of
power. The Ethics in Government Act2 8 3 established a procedure
for appointing an "independent counsel" to investigate violations
277. E.g., Chief Justice Burger wrote in the majority opinion in Bowsher that
the Federal government is divided into "three defined categories." 478 U.S. at
721. "The framers recognized that, in the long term, structural protections against
abuse of power were critical . . . ." Id. at 730.
278. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
279. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 723.
280. See supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text.
281. Id.
282. 487 U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 2598 (1988).
283. 28 U.S.C.A. § 591-599 (1988) (The Ethics in Government Act is hereaf-
ter referred to as the Act).
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of federal criminal law by high ranking officers of the Executive
Branch.2 84 The Act provides that, upon receipt of information
which discloses that there may have been a violation of federal
criminal law, the Attorney General is to conduct a preliminary in-
vestigation.286 After the investigation is completed, the Attorney
General is required to report to a panel of the fedeal Courts, 86
called the Special Division, which has the task of appointing inde-
pendent counsel. If the Attorney General has determined that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation is
justified, then he is required to apply to the Special Division for
appointment of independent counsel.87 After receiving this appli-
cation from the Attorney General, the Special Division is required
to appoint an independent counsel and define that counsel's juris-
dicition. s2 s After appointment, the independent counsel has virtu-
ally all of the powers of the Attorney General to investigate the
crimes within his jurisdiction as defined by the statement of the
Special Division. The Attorney General is required to suspend his
investigation at that time.289 The independent counsel remains in
office until his investigation or prosecution is completed, or until
he has been removed for good cause by the Attorney General.2 90
In Morrison v. Olson, Olson, the appellee, was an assistant at-
torney general for the Office of Legal Counsel for the EPA. In con-
nection with a dispute over the "Superfund Law," ' and in com-
pliance with the advice of the Justice Department, the President
ordered the Administrator of the EPA to claim executive privilege
and withold certain documents from subcommittees of the House
of Representatives which were holding hearings on the Superfund.
Although the controversy was ultimately compromised with the re-
lease of part of the documents which the House Subcommittees
sought, the House Judiciary Committee later began an investiga-
tion into the part played by the Justice Deparment in the
284. Morrison, 108 S.Ct. at 2603.
285. 28 U.S.C.A. § 591(d)(2).
286. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2603 (the judicial panel will be hereafter referred
to as the Special Division).
287. 28 U.S.C.A. § 592.
288. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2603.
289. 108 S. Ct. at 2604.
290. 108 S. Ct. at 2604-05.
291. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767, 42 U.S.C. § 9601.
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"Superfund Hearing" controversy.292 Olson testified before a judi-
ciary subcommitee.
Later, members of the Judiciary Committee issued a report
which suggested that Olson had given false or misleading testi-
mony at the subcommittee hearing. This report was sent to the
Attorney General. He conducted a preliminary investigation, and
concluded that an independent counsel should be appointed to in-
vestigate and/or prosecute Olson in accordance with the Act, and
applied to the Special Division for appointment of a special coun-
sel.293 Olson refused to respond to subpoenas issued at the request
of the special counsel on the basis that the Act was unconstitu-
tional. After the district Court held that it was not unconstitu-
tional, the court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reversed. The court of appeals held: first, that the special counsel
was not an inferior officer under the Appointments Clause and
therefore had to be appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate; second, that the Act also violated the
Appointments Clause because it gave the power to a judicial officer
to appoint an official performing a "core" function in the executive
branch; third, that the delegation of several powers under the Act
to the special Division, a part of the judicial branch, violated Arti-
cle III of the Constitution; fourth, that the provisions of the Act
which prevent the Attorney General from removing the special
counsel from office violate separation of powers; and fifth, that the
Act interferes with the executive's duty to faithfully execute the
laws.29" '
In a majority opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
the Supreme Court reversed. Justice Scalia dissented. Specifically,
the majority held that the special counsel is an inferior officer
under the Appointments Clause. Therefore, Congress has the
power to provide for his appointment, that the power of the Spe-
cial Division to appoint the special counsel is not a prohibited in-
terbranch appointment under the Appointments Clause; that the
duties of the Special Division do not violate Article III; that the
Act does not interfere with the executive's duty to faithfully exe-
cute the laws. The majority analysis of the Appointments Clause
and of separation of powers concepts are matters of particular im-
portance for the analysis of removal and separation of powers;
292. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2605.
293. 108 S. Ct. at 2606.
294. 108 S. Ct. at 2607..
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therefore, those issues from the Morrison opinion will be analyzed
in some detail.
The Supreme Court rejected appellee's argument that the spe-
cial counsel was a principal officer under the Appointments Clause.
Although the majority conceded that there was little guidance in
the Appointments Clause on the difference between inferior and
principal officers,2 " the Court concluded that the circumstances in
the present case clearly indicate that the special counsel is an in-
ferior officer.296 The Court reasoned that numerous factors com-
bine to lead to the conclusion that the special counsel is an inferior
officer. These factors are: she is subject to removal by a higher ex-
ecutive branch official,297 under the Act, she has limited duties,298
the office is of limited jurisdiction in that the special counsel can
only act within the special and specific jurisdiction defined by the
Special Division in her appointment2 99 and her tenure is limited.300
The majority also rejected the argument that the Special Divi-
sion's power to appoint constituted an interbranch appointment
which was prohibited by the Appointments Clause. The analysis
first examined the text of the Appointments Clause and used the
case of Ex Parte Siebold 0 1 as its major precedent. The Court
noted that the Siebold case vested "significant discretion" in Con-
gress to vest appointment power of inferior officers and that there
was no reason to depart from the law as it had been defined in
295. "The line between "inferior" and "principal" officers is one that is far
from clear, and the Framers provided little guidance into where it should be
drawn." 108 S. Ct. 2608.
296. Id.
297. Id. (The Special Prosecutor may be removed by the Attorney General
for cause).
298. The Supreme Court reasoned that the "appellant is empowered by the
Act to perform only certain, limited duties." Id. The majority conceded that the
special prosecutor had full power within the area of his jurisdiction. However, the
Court noted that the special prosecutor may only prosecute against certain spe-
cific officers, and for certain specified federal crimes, and there is no power to
formulate policy. Id. at 2608-09.
299. Not only is the Act itself restricted in applicability to certain fed-
eral officials suspected of certain serious federal crimes, but an indepen-
dent counsel can only act within the scope of the jurisdiction that has
been granted by the Special Division pursuant to a request by the Attor-
ney General.
108 S. Ct. at 2609.
300. Id.
301. See supra notes 111-118 and accompanying text.
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Siebold.30 2 The Court also relied upon the history of the drafting of
the Appointments Clause at the Constitutional Convention.3 0 3 The
majority observed that the principal problem which the delegates
debated was who should have the authority to appoint judges. Sev-
eral proposals to transfer this power to the President were de-
feated.0 4 Only after agreeing on the language at the beginning of
the Appointments Clause for Presidential appointment with advice
and consent of the Senate for principal officers, 30 5 was the except-
ing Clause proposed by Governor Morris. Madison replied that the
proposed Clause did not go far enough because it did not give the
power of appointment below heads of departments. 306 The major-
ity observed that there was nothing stated in the debate nor in the
text of the Appointments Clause about interbranch appointments,
and it is clear that Congress intended to have substantial power in
the area.30 7
A major part of the Morrison opinion examined and rejected
the argument that the Act violated separation of powers principles.
Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that there were two separation
302. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2610.
303. Id.
304. Id. (citing 1 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, 232-233
(1966)).
305. "[A]mbassadors, and other public Ministers, Judges of the Supreme
Court, and all other Officers of the United States whose appointments are not
otherwise herein provided for." 2 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVEN-
TION, 498-499 (1966) (as cited in, Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2610).
306. 108 S. Ct. at 2610 (citing 2 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CON-
VENTION, 627 (1966)). The entire exchange is even more emphatic than the Su-
preme Court opinion reveals:
Art. II. sect. 2 (paragraph 2) to the end of this, Mr. Morris moved to
annex "but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such infer-
ior Officers as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of
law, or in the heads of Departments." Mr. Sherman made the motion.
Mr. Madison. It does not go far enough if it be necessary at
all-Superior Officers below Heads of Departments ought in some cases
to have the appointment of the lesser offices.
Mr. Morris. There is no necessity. Blank Commissions can be sent-
2 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 627 (1966).
307. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2611. The Court also pointed out, however that
the power of Congress was not unlimited, and as held in the Siebold decision, it is
limited by separation of power concerns, so that the function of one branch can-
not be impaired by the assignment of the appointment power, and the Siebold
principle that there could be no incongruity between the functions normally per-
formed by the assignee of the appointment power and the performance of their
normal duties.
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issues posed by the Act.3 8 The first was whether the removal pro-
visions of the Act which restricted the executive's representative,
the Attorney General, from removing the special counsel except for
cause, "impermissibly interferes with the President's exercise of
his Constitutionally appointed functions."30 9 The second issue was
whether the Act, taken as a whole, violated separation of powers
principles by limiting the President's capability of controlling the
prosecutorial powers which the special counsel exercises under the
Act.3 10
In dealing with the first issue, the majority was immediately
faced with the Bowsher and Myers precedents.3 11 For the majority,
those cases were clearly distinguishable. Bowsher was distinguisha-
ble because it involved an attempt by Congress to reserve to itself
power of removal over an officer who was engaged in executing the
law. Myers was distinguishable because it involved a Congressional
attempt to involve itself in the removal of an executive official.3 12
However, the majority reasoned that the Act does not involve a
Congressional attempt to play a role in removal of executive of-
ficers but places that removal power squarely and clearly in the
hands of the executive. 313 The Court reasoned that such placement
of removal power in the executive branch makes the Morrison
facts more akin to the facts of Humphrey's Executor and Wiener.
The majority in Morrison believed that the statements in Myers,
that the President had all-inclusive or inherent removal power over
all officers in government who were not part of the judicial or legis-
lative branch, were mere dicta.3 14 The Supreme Court reaffirmed
that the Humphrey's Executor decision had recognized that Con-
gress, in creating agencies which discharge judicial and legislative
functions as well as executive ones, has the power to fix the term of
office of officials within the agency and to define the causes for re-
moval.3 16 The majority also observed that in the Wiener decision,
the failure to fix any cause for removal for officers with adjudica-
tory tasks which were intended by the legislature to be performed
in a non-political fashion, was sufficient to insulate such officers
308. 108 S. Ct. at 2616.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. See supra notes 119-159 and 216-278 and accompanying text.
312. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2616.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 2617.
315. Id.
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from removal by the executive." 6 Thus, in considering the question
of which precedents control on the issues of whether restrictions
on the removal power of the executive interfere with the Presi-
dent's power to faithfully execute the laws, the majority held that
Humphrey's Executor and Wiener control, provided that Congress
is not the agency given the power to remove or that Congress is not
attempting to arrogate to itself an executive duty or function. 17
The appellee strenuously argued that the Humphrey's Execu-
tor and Wiener precedents were not relevant because the Act in-
volves interference with a "core executive function" and because
the special counsel is a "pure executive" officer.3 8 Under Myers,
he argued, the President must have complete discretion to remove
such an official. The position of the majority in rejecting this posi-
tion is the heart of the separation of powers analysis of the opin-
ion. The Chief Justice explained that the decision on the question
of whether Congress can impose restrictions on removal by the ex-
ecutive cannot turn on such rigid classifications as whether the of-
fice involved is "purely executive" or not.31 9 This follows for sev-
eral reasons. First, it is simply too difficult to define or create
classifications of "purely executive" or "purely legislative" offi-
cials.32 0 Instead, the Chief Justice observed that:
... [t]he analysis contained in our removal cases is designed not
to define rigid categories of those officials who may or may not be
removed at will by the President, but to ensure that Congress
does not interfere with the President's exercise of the "executive
power" and his Constitutionally appointed duty to "take care
that the laws be faithfully executed" under Article II .... We do
not mean to suggest that an analysis of the functions served by
the officials at issue is irrelevant. But the real question is whether
the removal restrictions are of such a nature that they impede the
President's ability to perform his Constitutional duty, and the
functions of the officials in question must be analyzed in that
light.32 '
316. Id.
317. 108 S. Ct. at 2622.
318. 108 S. Ct. at 2617.
319. 108 S. Ct. at 2618.
320. "The difficulty of defining such categories of "executive" or "quasi-legis-
lative" officials is illustrated by a comparison of our decisions in cases such as
Humphrey's Executor, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 140-141, and Bowsher, supra
478 U.S., at -, 106 S. Ct. at 3211." 108 S. Ct. 2618, n. 28.
321. 108 S. Ct. at 2619.
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Applying this test to the Act, the majority concluded that the im-
position of a good cause standard neither interfered with executive
authority generally, nor did it interfere with the power of the exec-
utive to control or supervise the special counsel in a way that was
not permitted by the Constitution.32 2
The majority also concluded that the Act, taken as a whole,
does not violate the concept of separation of powers by interfering
with the duties and rules of the executive branch. 23 One of the
starting points of the analysis was the observation that, while the
framers viewed separation of powers as a self-executing safeguard
against encroachment by one branch against another, they did not
believe that the three branches of government were to work with
total independence.2  In examining separation of powers
problems, the Court noted that the first and principal inquiry must
be whether one branch seeks to usurp the powers of another.32 5 In
Morrison, although members of Congress could request the Attor-
ney General to apply to the Special Division for appointment of
special counsel, the Attorney General has no duty to do so, and the
other Congressional duties under the Act were limited principally
to receiving reports and oversight.326 Thus, there was no legislative
usurpation of the executive function. Nor was there any judicial
usurpation of executive function, for the rule of the Special Divi-
sion was quite limited. 27 The majority reasoned, finally, that the
322. Id. The Chief Justice concluded that executive authority was not gener-
ally interfered with (e.g., a core function was not disturbed), because the Special
Prosecutor is an inferior officer with limited jurisdiction and discretion, and the
Majority "simply do not see how the President's need to control the exercise of
that [limited] discretion is . . . central to the functioning of the Executive Branch
...." The Chief Justice concluded that executive power to control or supervise
the Special Prosecutor was not unduly confined because power to remove had not
been completely stripped from the executive, and because under the for cause
removal provisions the executive has the power to insure that the Special Prose-
cutor is performing the duties specified by the Act.
323. 108 S.Ct. at 2620.
324. Id. (the majority opinion cited James Madison in THE FEDERALIST, No.
47 for this proposition).
325. "We observe first that this case does not involve an attempt by Congress
to increase its own powers at the expense of the Executive Branch .... [T]his
case simply does not pose a "dange[r] of congressional usurpation of Executive
Branch functions." 108 S.Ct. 2620.
326. 108 S.Ct. at 2621.
327. .. . We note nonetheless that under the Act the Special Division has
no power to appoint an independent counsel sua sponte; it may only do
so upon the specific request of the Attorney General, and the courts are
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Act does not unconstitutionally undermine the powers of the exec-
utive branch." 8 The principal reasons for this conclusion were that
the executive has a measure of control through the Attorney Gen-
eral to supervise or remove a special counsel who does not properly
execute the Act.3
29
Justice Scalia's dissent focused principally upon separation of
powers analysis. He began by considering the command of Article
II, section 1, clause 1 that the executive power is vested in the
President. He argued that this means the President has all, not
some, of the executive power.3 0 Therefore, he argued if the con-
duct of a criminal prosecution is the exercise of purely executive
power, and if the Act deprives the President of exclusive control
over that power, then the Act violates separation of powers princi-
ples and is therefore unconstitutional.331 Justice Scalia carefully
examined these questions and answered both of them in the af-
firmative. In the first place, he argued, law enforcement functions
are "typically" executive in nature and have "always" been con-
ducted by the executive.- 32 Secondly, he argued, there can be no
specifically prevented from reviewing the Attorney General's decision not
to seek appointment. In addition, once the court has appointed a counsel
and defined her jurisdiction, it has no power to supervise or control the
activities of the counsel.
Id.
328. Id.
329. It is undeniable that the Act reduces the amount of control or su-
pervision that the Attorney General and, through him, the President ex-
ercises .... Nonetheless, the Act does give the Attorney General several
means of supervising or controlling the prosecutorial powers that may be
wielded by an independent counsel. Most importantly, the Attorney
General retains the power to remove the counsel for "good cause," a
power that we have already concluded provides the Executive with sub-
stantial ability to ensure that the laws are "faithfully executed" by an
independent counsel. No independent counsel may be appointed without
a specific request by the Attorney General, and the Attorney General's
decision not to request appointment if he finds "no reasonable grounds
to believe that further investigation is warranted" is committed to his
unreviewable discretion. The Act thus gives the executive a degree of
control over the power to initiate an investigation by the independent
counsel .... [I]n our view these features of the Act give the Executive
Branch sufficient control over the independent counsel to ensure that the
President is able to perform his constitutionally assigned duties.
108 S.Ct. at 2621-2622.
330. 108 S.Ct. at 2626 (emphasis in original).
331. Id.
332. 108 S.Ct. at 2726.
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doubt that the Act deprives the President of control for such depr-
rivation is the "whole object of the statute." '333 The fact that the
Attorney General has "some" control in the language of the major-
ity,334 and through him the executive branch, is a misnomer for
Justice Scalia, for he argues that in fact the Act accomplished a
substantial reduction in the power of the President to control
criminal investigations and prosecutions. 5 He concludes this part
of his analysis with the observation that, when the majority con-
cedes that it is undeniable that the Act reduces executive control,
then "the case is over," because any reduction in the executive's
control over investigation and prosecution violates separation of
powers principles.33 For Justice Scalia, the language of Article II is
clear and definite: the President's duties include complete control
over investigation and prosecution.3
In a second part of his analysis, he argued that the majority
opinion is a clear break with the Supreme Court precedents, for it
substitutes a balancing test for measuring incursions against the
President's power instead of traditional separation of powers con-
cepts. 38 That test, he argues, is a standardless, ad hoc announce-
ment which is utterly without precedent. 9 As a result, it cannot
be predicted where the incursions on the President's duties will
cease.
The approach of the majority in the Morrison case was per-
333. 108 S.Ct. at 2627.
334. Id.
335. . . .Instead, the Court points out that the President, through his
Attorney General has at least some control. That concession is alone
enough to invalidate the statute, but I cannot refrain from pointing out
that the Court greatly exaggerates the extent of that "some" presidential
control. 'Most importan[t] "among these controls, the Court asserts, is
the 'power to remove the counsel for 'good cause.'" This is somewhat
like referring to shackles as an effective means of locomotion. As we rec-
ognized in Humphrey's Executor v. United States, -indeed, what
Humphrey's Executor was all about-limiting removal power to "good
cause" is an impediment to, not an effective grant of, presidential
control.
108 S.Ct. at 2627 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
336. 108 S.Ct. at 2628.
337. 108 S.Ct. at 2629.
338. Id.
339. 108 S.Ct. at 2629-2630. Justice Scalia also argued that the majority's
interpretation of the Appointments Clause was erroneous and not consistent with
Supreme Court precedents, and that the primary check against prosecutorial
abuse is a political one.
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suasive, and certainly more consistent with history and precedent
than the Bowsher case. The analysis of the Appointments Clause
questions in Morrison is as good as one could expect from the
cryptic Constitutional language. The examination of the inferior
officer issue in a manner which is textual and pragmatic makes
sense, especially in view of the fact that the majority searched for
guidance in the intent of the framers but found none. The han-
dling of the interbranch appointment issue was also carefully ana-
lyzed.340 The majority turned to the pragmatic approach of the
Siebold precedent after finding that history gave no guidance be-
cause the framers were arguing about other matters. In short, the
majority approach in Morrison was a balanced, reasonable one
which, in the absence of express textual guidance in the Appoint-
ments Clause, sought to reach a realistic result by interpreting that
Clause in the context of the Constitutional concept of separation of
powers. The majority used Constitutional context to give meaning
to the language of the Appointments Clause. This method was
preferable to imbuing meaning into that Clause as a result of ideol-
ogy, as the majority had apparently done in the Bowsher opinion.
The majority treatment of the separation of powers issues was
historically and conceptually more accurate than the treatment of
that problem in Bowsher. In the first place, the reliance of
Humphrey's Executor and the rejection of Myers helped to insure
that the decision of the Supreme Court in Morrison would be con-
sistent with the framers' conceptions of separation of powers. This
was so because the position of the Court in the Humphrey's Exec-
utor decision correctly assessed the intent of the participants in
the "Great Debate" on the Decision of 1789 and the debates at the
Constitutional convention on separation of powers and removal.
This was especially true for the description of Madison's position.
The Morrison majority was also well-advised to reject the Bowsher
decision, for the majority in Bowsher unsuccessfully attempted to
reconcile the inconsistent precedents in the Myers, Humphrey's
Executor, and Wiener decisions and relied for its history of the
framers' intent on Myers, which was clearly inaccurate. The histor-
ical record simply did not reveal enough about the framers' intent
in drafting the Appointments Clause, and the Morrison majority
was perceptive enough to realize this inadequacy. The position
which they took, to look pragmatically in context at whether the
power of the President to execute the laws has been impeded by
340. 108 S.Ct. at 2609.
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imposing for cause removal restrictions, has the advantage of pre-
serving the general objectives of separation of power as well as can
be gathered from the historical record.
The majority's resolution of the second separation issue,
whether the Act as a whole limits the Presidential power to prose-
cute and thus is unconstitutional, contains the most important in-
sight in the opinion. The recognition that the concept of separation
of powers does not define bright line boundaries which exactly seal
off and identify each of the three types of powers exercised by the
branches under the Constitution is consistent with the ideas of the
framers. They recognized that blending-the idea that the powers
of -the respective branches would not be absolutely sealed off one
from another- was an essential part of the American Constitu-
tion, and in this feature it differed from the concepts of separation
of powers with which the Colonists were familiar. That difference
was the subject of spirited debate and discussion before the adop-
tion of the Constitution. Madison staunchly defended it and since
the version which Madison defended was the form of Constitution
which was finally adopted, it is safe to assume that blending is part
of the concept of separation of powers in the United States Consti-
tution. Finally, the crucial inquiry which the Morrison majority
recognized-whether realistically one branch is seeking to usurp
the powers of another-appears to be fully consistent with the phi-
losophy and intent of the framers. And, although it is an inquiry
which is general in nature, it does have the advantage of preserving
and giving effect to the central idea and purpose of the separation
doctrine.
VI. CONCLUSION
Morrison v. Olson is the most recent case involving the execu-
tive removal power, and in that case the Supreme Court has ad-
dressed two issues which have been part of our jurisprudence since
the Constitution was adopted. The Supreme Court dealt with
those issues, the extent and breadth of Presidential removal power,
and the meaning and impact of separation of powers in removal
cases, in a fashion which is consistent with the intent of the fram-
ers and with the historical meaning on these subjects.
The Morrison decision was consistent with the history and
concept of separation of powers. Originating for the colonists with
Locke and Montesquieu, that doctrine began as a device to pre-
serve individual rights and liberties by limiting the power of the
king along functional lines. However, as explained by these earlier
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writers, the doctrine was never concise, and the inability to exactly
define the powers of each branch created a major problem in draft-
ing the Constitution. The task of explaining the form which sepa-
ration of powers took in the then-proposed Constitution fell to
James Madison. His argument was essentially that, although exact
definitions of the powers of the three branches of government were
very difficult, nevertheless separation of powers was a crucial part
of the Constitution. Madison argued that attempts to spell out
rigid boundaries and precise paper definitions had failed in the
state Constitutions which preceded the Constitution. Because of
this inability to draw exact boundaries and to exactly define the
powers of each branch, Madison defended what was then known as
"blending" or mixing of powers of the branches. Madison's classic
defense of separation of powers, the doctrine of checks and bal-
ances, recognized that powers were difficult to exactly define. Thus
there would be some overlap, mixing of function and lack of defini-
tion, and that in that situation each branch would act to check the
other. Under Madison's scheme of separation of powers a process
was created in which ambiguous boundaries and overlap permitted
officers of different branches to claim powers claimed by other
branches. The very lack of definition and fuzziness of boundaries is
what made this dynamic, self-correcting Constitutional process
work.
Viewed against this background, it is possible to assess the
major decisions and cases on the subject of removal in a new light,
and to see that the Morrison decision is fully consistent with ear-
lier precedents which also correctly perceived the intent of the
framers.
The earliest was the decision of the First Congress, which has
come to be known as the Decision of 1789. Although later cases
argued that the language of the statute involved there recognized
an inherent executive power of removal, that position only took
into account one version of the text of the statute. Upon more
careful analysis, the record of the debates discloses that the Deci-
sion of 1789 did not stand for the proposition that a large number
of Framers of the Constitution believed that the President had in-
herent removal power. On the contrary, only a few, perhaps as few
as six members of the First Congress, believed so.
In the case of Myers v. United States,3 1 Chief Justice Taft,
who had himself been President before he became a Justice of the
341. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
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Supreme Court, wrote a hymn of praise to the Presidency in which
he held that the executive possessed extensive inherent removal
power. His chief analytical tool was to conduct a historical search
for the framers' intent at the Constitutional Convention and in the
Decision of 1789.
Justice Taft reasoned that the Virginia Plan at the Convention
transferred all executive power to the President, but that under
the Articles of Confederation, Congress had exercised executive
power. He concluded that therefore, this transfer of executive
power from Congress to the President meant that the power to re-
move was transferred to the President along with the general exec-
utive power. It can be persuasively argued that Chief Justice Taft's
reasoning is merely unsupported assumption or even speculation.
As one Myers dissenter pointed out, it was also true that all Presi-
dential powers were carefully enumerated in the Articles of Con-
federation, and the same scheme of enumeration of Presidential
powers was followed in the Constitution. Therefore, particular
Presidential powers exist only if and as enumerated. Since removal
is nowhere mentioned except in connection with impeachment, the
President has no inherent removal power. A second flaw in the
sweeping assertions of inherent Presidential removal power in the
Myers decision was its assumption of a broad general concept or
philosophy under which the President of necessity had removal
power. This concept simply did not exist at the Constitutional
Convention. Partisan political battle, practical necessity and realis-
tic political compromise, rather than shared abstract convictions or
purposes, were the processes which resulted in the drafting of the
Appointments Clause and the various sections of the Constitution
dealing with Presidential and Congressional power.
The Chief Justice's reading of the Decision of 1789 was
equally questionable. He relied principally upon the text of the
statute which the first Congress enacted for his conclusion: first,
that the President's removal power was the principal issue in the
passage of that statute; and second, for his conclusion that the ma-
jority of the Representatives believed that the executive possessed
broad inherent removal power. He also interpreted remarks which
James Madison made in the "Great Debate" on the subject of the
President's removal power literally and out of context. In short,
the Chief Justice's interpretation was simplistic. There were many
issues joined at the "Great Debate", and more importantly, many
reasons for representativies to vote for the statute other than a be-
lief in extensive, inherent executive removal power. Probably only
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a few representatives of the First Congress believed that the Presi-
dent had inherent removal power. And there is cause to believe
that, even among those who argued that the President had broad
removal power, they held this belief only because the specific office
being created in the Decision of 1789 was clearly and wholly politi-
cal, a point which James Madison made one week after the
Decision.
The reliance of the majority in the Morrison case upon
Humphrey's Executor v. United States34 2 was sound, for that pre-
cedent was more probably accurate about the framers' intent. The
Supreme Court in Humphrey's Executor relied on the distinction
made in the case of Marbury v. Madison34 3 that the nature or
character of the office concerned is important in a general way to
define the extent of the removal power. This was, once again, al-
most certainly the understanding of James Madison, and very
probably the understanding of many other framers. Applied to the
Decision of 1789, this reading of the removal power of the Presi-
dent was consistent not only with the text of the statute, but also
with the positions taken by most factions in the House in the
"Great Debate."
The Morrison majority was also probably closer to the fram-
ers' intent in rejecting or distinguishing the opinion in Bowsher v.
Synar.1" The reliance in Bowsher on a rigid, structural, sharply
bounded concept of separation of powers was, as has been seen,
not consistent with the concept of separation of powers as that
doctrine existed prior to the adoption of the Constitution or as
that doctrine was incorporated into the Constitution. The Bowsher
opinion is filled with what appear to be historical inaccuracies or
misunderstandings. Chief Justice Burger in Bowsher relied on the
Myers decision for his historical analysis, but the historical analy-
sis on the subjects of removal and separation of powers in Myers
was almost certainly incorrect. The assertions in the Bowsher opin-
ion that Humphrey's Executor and Myers are similar were disin-
genuous, for while those opinions both recognize the Constitutional
concept of separation of powers generally, as they must, any simi-
larity between the two opinions ends there. The two opinions as-
sert almost wholly opposed versions of the Presidential removal
power, which are based upon two inconsistent readings of the his-
342. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
343. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
344. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
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tory and context of that doctrine and does not reflect the intent of
the framers. The assumption of rigid boundaries and definitions
for the powers of the three branches simply does not match the
understanding of the framers as expressed in The Federalist by
Madison. It was recognized there that the problems of definition
and overlap between the branches could not be solved in any abso-
lute, rigid manner and so "blending" was necessary in the
Constitution.
The decision in Morrison v. Olson is an important opinion, for
the Supreme Court in it squarely faced several major removal and
separation issues. The holding that for cause restrictions on Presi-
dential removal powers is not an unconstitutional invasion of the
power of the executive so long as Congress does not reserve the
power to remove to itself is consistent with the history of separa-
tion of powers and with the intent of the framers. The Supreme
Court's resolution of that issue realistically recognizes the implica-
tions of the "blending" of function which was built into the Consti-
tution: as applied in the Morrison decision, this meant that some
overlap, some mixed functions between branches may exist, and
that there are no exact boundaries or absolute definitions of power
usually specified in the text of the Constitution. Thus, the argu-
ment that the case should be decided on the basis of a rigid defini-
tion of pure executive power was correctly rejected. The conclusion
of the majority in the Morrison opinion that the real test in re-
moval cases is whether realistically one branch is seeking to usurp
the power of another is consistent with understanding about sepa-
ration of powers when the Constitution was drafted, and with the
pragmatic political accomodations respecting the power of the
branches which the framers included in the Constitution.
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